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This paper will explore the implications of congressional oversight of homeland security, 
specifically the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Oversight of DHS has been 
extensively researched since the 9/11 Commission recommended that it be reformed. 
This thesis argues that much of the previous research into this topic relied on a limited 
view of oversight and used a limited set of tools to measure it. This thesis reviews the 
existing literature on homeland security oversight and offers alternative ways of 
measuring oversight. It conducts two case studies to establish a more complete view of 
homeland security oversight. Then, it quantitatively analyzes legislative data and offers a 
new approach to using agency interactions to provide a more meaningful picture of 
homeland security oversight. Finally, the thesis offers recommendations based on the 
conclusions of the research to achieve optimal congressional oversight of homeland 
security.    
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.	 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1	
II.	 LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7	
A.	 PRIMARY LITERATURE RESOURCES ...................................................8	
1.	 Commissions Addressing “Homeland Security” Prior to 9/11 ........9	
2.	 Think Tank Reviews ..........................................................................10	
3.	 Data and Analysis from DHS and Media Coverage .......................13	
4.	 Academic Research ............................................................................15	
B.	 SECONDARY SOURCES ............................................................................18	
III.	 HOMELAND SECURITY OVERSIGHT BACKGROUND ................................21	
A.	 CONCEPT OF OVERSIGHT ......................................................................21	
B.	 METHODS OF MEASURING OVERSIGHT ...........................................23	
1.	 Agency Interaction .............................................................................24	
2.	 Explicit Jurisdiction ...........................................................................27	
3.	 Bill Referral Precedent ......................................................................29	
IV.	 CASE STUDY REVIEWS ........................................................................................33	
A.	 UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION ..........................................33	
1.	 Agency Interaction .............................................................................34	
2.	 Explicit Jurisdiction ...........................................................................35	
3.	 Bill Referrals .......................................................................................36	
B.	 HURRICANE KATRINA OVERSIGHT ....................................................40	
1.	 Agency Interaction .............................................................................40	
2.	 Explicit Jurisdiction ...........................................................................45	
3.	 Bill Referrals .......................................................................................54	
V.	 QUANTITATIVE DATA ..........................................................................................61	
A.	 THE IMPACT OF MULTIPLE REFERRALS ON HOMELAND 
SECURITY .....................................................................................................61	
B.	 A NEW APPROACH TO VISUALIZING HOMELAND SECURITY 
OVERSIGHT .................................................................................................65	
VI.	 RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION ..........................................79	
A.	 RECOMMENDATIONS TO CHANGE CONGRESSIONAL RULES ...79	
1.	 Issue 1 ..................................................................................................79	
2.	 Issue 2 ..................................................................................................80	
3.	 Issue 3 ..................................................................................................81	
4.	 Issue 4 ..................................................................................................82	
5.	 Issue 5 ..................................................................................................83	
B.	 RECOMMENDATIONS WITHOUT RULE CHANGES .........................84	
1.	 Issue 6 ..................................................................................................85	
2.	 Issue 7 ..................................................................................................86	
C.	 RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE DUPLICATION .........................86	
1.	 Issue 8 ..................................................................................................87	
 viii
2.	 Issue 9 ..................................................................................................89	
3.	 Issue 10 ................................................................................................90	
4.	 Issue 11 ................................................................................................91	
5.	 Issue 12 ................................................................................................92	
6.	 Issue 13 ................................................................................................93	
7.	 Issue 14 ................................................................................................95	
D.	 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................96	
APPENDIX A.	 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................99	
APPENDIX B.	 HURRICANE KATRINA HEARINGS .........................................101	
APPENDIX C.	 2010 BRIEFING DATA RELATIONAL TABLE ........................109	
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................113	




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.	 “Spider web chart” of committee oversight of DHS elements. .......................12	
Figure 2.	 Congressional oversight of DHS .....................................................................66	
Figure 3.	 DHS wire diagram ...........................................................................................67	
Figure 4.	 CSIS/BENS “spider web” chart .......................................................................68	
Figure 5.	 DHS congressional engagement 112th Congress .............................................69	
Figure 6.	 DHS 2010 relational briefing data displayed by Net Draw .............................72	
Figure 7.	 DHS briefing data, with notional tiers of jurisdiction......................................73	
Figure 8.	 Oversight of immigration and border security .................................................74	
Figure 9.	 Oversight of immigration and border security without homeland security 
committees .......................................................................................................75	
Figure 10.	 Preparedness and response without the homeland security committees ..........76	
Figure 11.	 Preparedness and response with guidance from the homeland security 
committees .......................................................................................................76	
Figure 12.	 Tiers of oversight .............................................................................................96	
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.	 USFA Hearings 109th–112th Congress .............................................................34	
Table 2.	 Bill referrals relating to USFA .........................................................................37	
Table 3.	 DHS Hurricane Katrina hearings by committee ..............................................42	
Table 4.	 Committee jurisdiction as provided by House and Senate rules. .....................47	
Table 5.	 Hearings related to Hurricane Katrina held by the House Committee on 
Financial Services 2005–2006 .........................................................................51	
Table 6.	 Number and percentage of referrals of emergency management bills and 
resolutions introduced by committee, 109th Congress .....................................55	
Table 7.	 Number and percentage of referrals of emergency management passed 
bills and resolutions by committee, 109th Congress ........................................57	
Table 8.	 Authorization bills referred to House Committee on Homeland Security 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFG  Assistance to firefighter Grants 
BENS  Business Executives for National Security 
CBP  U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
CHS  House Committee on Homeland Security 
CHS  House Committee on Homeland Security 
CISOMB Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman 
CNE  Counter Narcotics Enforcement 
CQ  Congressional Quarterly 
CRCL  Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
CRS  Congressional research Service 
CS&T  Senate Commerce Science and Transportation Committee 
CSIS  Center for Strategic and International Studies 
DHS  U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
DNDO  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
DOD  Department of Defense 
EPW  Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
GCR  Gulf Coast Recovery Office 
HAC  House Appropriations Committee 
HAg   House Agriculture Committee 
HASC  House Armed Services Committee 
HE&C  House Energy and Commerce Committee 
HFA  House Foreign Affairs Committee 
HFS  House Financial Service Committee 
HJC  House Judiciary Committee 
HNR  House Committee on Natural resources 
HSci   House Science and Technology Committee 
HSGAC Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
HUD  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
 xiv
I&A  Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
ICE  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IG  Inspector General 
IGA  Intergovernmental Affairs 
MGMT Management Directorate 
NPPD  National Protection and Programs Directorate 
OCFO  Office of the Chief Financial Officer 
OCIO  Office of the Chief Information Officer 
OGC  Officer of the General Counsel 
OGR  House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
OHA  Office of Health Affairs 
OIG  Office of the Inspector General 
OLA  Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
OPS  Operations Coordination and Planning 
PLCY  Office of Policy 
PRIV  Privacy Office 
S&T  Science and Technology Directorate 
SAC  Senate Appropriations Committee 
SAFER Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Grants 
SAg   Senate Agriculture Committee 
SASC  Senate Armed Services Committee 
SBud   Senate Budget 
SENR  Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
SFin   Senate Finance Committee 
SFR  Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
SIA  Senate Indian Affairs Committee 
SJC  Senate Judiciary Committee 
SSB  Senate Small Business 
SSCI  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
T&I  House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
TSA  Transportation Security Administration 
USCG  United States Coast Guard 
 xv
USCIS  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
USFA  U.S. Fire Administration 
USSS  United States Secret Service 








I would like to thank my wife for supporting me in this master’s program and 
specifically for her help editing this thesis. I would like to thank my colleagues in the 
DHS Office of Legislative Affairs for their work over the years, the meticulous records 
they keep, and their insights on this topic. Many of my professors at the Naval 
Postgraduate School have helped me think about homeland security in new ways. 
Specifically, I’d like to thank Dr. Sean Everton for introducing me to social network 
analysis, which I hope will feature prominently in all future discussions of congressional 
oversight of homeland security. Finally, I very much appreciate the work of my advisors 
who helped me organize my ideas and research. 
 xviii




This paper will explore the implications of the current congressional oversight of 
the homeland security and, specifically, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Oversight of DHS has been extensively researched since the 9/11 Commission 
recommended that it be reformed.1 This thesis argues that much of the previous research 
into this topic relied on a limited view of oversight and used a limited set of tools to 
measure it. This thesis will review the existing literature on homeland security oversight 
and offer two alternative ways of measuring oversight to augment the consensus method 
used (measuring agency interactions with Congress). In addition to the agency interaction 
method, bill referral analysis and a review of explicit jurisdiction in the rules of the 
House and Senate will be applied to two case studies to establish a more complete view 
of homeland security oversight. Then, the thesis will analyze legislative data from 
Congress.gov to further explore the implications of the current congressional oversight of 
DHS. Lastly, it will offer a new approach to using agency interactions to provide a 
meaningful picture of homeland security oversight. The thesis will offer 
recommendations, based on the conclusions of the research, to achieve optimal 
congressional oversight of homeland security. 
The 9/11 Commission2 identified four key failures that contributed to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. One of the failures was in counterterrorism policy.3 
Insofar as policy is set or altered through congressional oversight, the commission 
recommended that the United States Congress reform the way it conducts oversight over 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [9/11 Commission], The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 348–50. 
2 The 9/11 Commission, formally the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, was created pursuant to P.L. 107–306. It was chaired by former Governor Thomas H. Kean (R-NJ) 
and vice-chaired by former Representative Lee H. Hamilton (D-IN). Its final report was issued July 22, 
2004. 
3 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 348–50. 
2 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), citing specifically the number of 
committees and subcommittees that have jurisdiction over DHS:4 
Recommendation: Congress should create a single, principal point of 
oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are 
best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this 
department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the 
obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this 
committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan 
staff.5 
The commissioners labeled their congressional reform recommendation as “one 
of the most difficult and important.” 6  In addition, they recognized any success in 
achieving a “unity of effort in executive management [could] be lost if it is fractured by 
divided congressional oversight.” 7  Despite frequent attention on the nature of the 
problem and support for the recommendation’s implementation, it is one of the “major 
unfinished” recommendations of the commission’s final report. 8  The commissioners 
identified a problem with homeland security and recommended a solution, which is 
problematic because the problem the commissioners saw was based on an incomplete 
understanding of how Congress oversees complex issues, perhaps an incomplete 
understanding of the nature of homeland security and an extremely limited view of how 
oversight is measured.  
In contrast to many of the other recommendations supported throughout the 
report, there is very little background arguing in favor of the recommendation to 
reorganize oversight of homeland security in Congress. The report indicated the members 
of the 9/11 Commission relied on the work of previous commissions. While the earlier 
commissions on homeland security also recommend a singular homeland security 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 421. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 420. 
7 Ibid. 
8 National Security Preparedness Group, Tenth Anniversary Report Card: The Status of the 9/11 
Commission Recommendations (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 10, 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/CommissionRecommendations.pdf. 
3 
committee, similar to a singular intelligence committee, they were written before the 
creation of DHS. 
Fractured oversight potentially creates serious problems for homeland security. 
DHS has outlined the time and resources it spends responding to congressional oversight 
requests, often to multiple committees on the same topic. 9  Different congressional 
committees, owing to their varying foci, have given conflicting policy direction to 
DHS.10 In addition, jurisdictional battles within Congress impact the quality and speed of 
passage of necessary legislation.11 Furthermore, the fragmentation of DHS congressional 
oversight has contributed to the “anemic” homeland security policy regime by not 
creating a parallel support structure to DHS to promote homeland security outside the 
federal government.12 
Homeland security is a multidisciplinary field that includes such disparate 
functions as public health, fire services, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and flood 
mitigation. Thus, it is not surprising that the field would be overseen by multiple 
committees of Congress. 13  The 9/11 Commission and others have argued that in 
overseeing these pieces of homeland security, Congress needs to reorganize to ensure that 
it could effectively gauge whether the Department of Homeland Security and the 
homeland security enterprise are effectively protecting America. The commission 
contemplated that there could be oversight by more than one committee through a 
“principal,” not exclusive, committee in each house of Congress. Therefore, it is 
necessary to measure jurisdiction to gauge progress toward implementation. As this thesis 
will discuss, the method of measurement is important as it will produce different pictures 
                                                 
9 Michael Chertoff, letter to Peter T. King, May 25, 2007, http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=683475.  
10 Task Force on Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Aspen, CO: Aspen Institute, 2013), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/task-
force-report-streamlining-consolidating-congressional-oversight-us-department, 9–17; Timothy G. M. 
Balunis, and William D. Hemphill, Gordium Revisited: Beyond the Jurisdictional Entanglement of DHS 
(Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2008), 10–21.  
11 Task Force, Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight.  
12 Peter J. May, Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne, “Constructing Homeland Security: An 
Anemic Policy Regime,” Policy Studies Journal 39, no. 2 (2011): 285–307. 
13 Ibid. 
4 
of jurisdiction and lead to different conclusions about how best to optimize Congress’s 
role in homeland security policy. The 9/11 Commission is right that Congress has an 
incredibly important role in homeland security policy. Its recommendation on how best to 
optimize that role needs to be re-assessed in light of their limited analysis on this topic. 
This thesis seeks to answer the question of how to optimize homeland security 
congressional oversight. 
Research Design 
This thesis investigates oversight of homeland security by the United States 
Congress. It will examine the recommendations that came out of the 9/11 Commission 
and others that aimed to improve oversight by consolidating it. 
From the literature, the thesis establishes that there are several ways to measure 
congressional oversight over issues or agencies and that though each measure produces 
different picture of oversight, none is perfect or complete. The differences in these 
pictures provides insight into homeland security and its oversight structure. The 
application of the three methods to all of homeland security is likely to be too complex to 
be useful in gaining greater understanding. The case studies aim to look at a consumable 
piece of DHS. In both case studies, three methods of measuring oversight will be applied 
to different subsets of homeland security: a sub-agency within DHS and a major 
homeland security event. Both case studies will examine whether it would improve 
policy to make changes in the oversight structure.  
The thesis also includes a quantitative analysis of available data on agency 
interactions and legislation that will examine whether the oversight structure has had any 
impacts on homeland security and if there are opportunities to improve the structure.  
Selection 
Both overall homeland security and the Department Homeland Security will be 
reviewed. The cases and quantitative data were selected both on the availability of data 




This study does not look at oversight of homeland security from groups outside of 
the U.S. Congress and will only address homeland security elements outside of DHS in a 
limited way. This is in part due to limitations on the available data.  
Type and Mode of Analysis 
The research will make use of case study analysis to identify specific areas of 
homeland security and evaluate whether changes in their oversight structure would 
impact homeland security policy. In addition, the research will also look at the nature of 
homeland security and evaluate the capacity of Congress to change oversight.  
The research will also utilize quantitative analysis of congressional activity (DHS 
hearing and briefing metrics) and bill referrals and other data to evaluate the oversight of 
homeland security from Congress. In addition, the thesis will include analysis of the 
hearing and briefing counts from which other studies have derived the number of 
committees with oversight of DHS. Furthermore the research will look more critically at 
that data and offer more complex analysis of it. Additionally, in order to provide a more 
detailed and nuanced view, the data will be analyzed relationally, that is studying which 
committees have exercised oversight over which parts of DHS. This study will also 
analyze briefing data, which is more plentiful then hearing data, and data pertaining to 
bill referrals. Whereas a review of bill referrals in the cases studies will provide insight 
into specific parts of homeland security, additional insight could be gleaned from 
analyzing bulk data.  
Output 
The finished product will reassess the previous recommendations (including that 
of the 9/11 Commission) that have been made and take a deeper look by offering 
alternative methods for analysis in the policy area. It will determine what if any steps 
Congress should take to improve oversight of homeland security. If the research shows 
that consolidation, as the 9/11 Commission popularized in its recommendation, is not a 
6 
valid way to improve oversight, the conclusion will offer a new framework for thinking 
about oversight to better guide future homeland security leaders. 
Chapter II will review all the relevant literature on congressional oversight of 
DHS and how it came into being, how it has changed, and what recommendations for 
change there have been. The review will also cover the purpose of oversight, various 
styles of oversight, and establish three methods for measuring oversight, including how 
these have been applied to DHS in the past. Chapter III will apply each of the three 
methods of measuring oversight established in the literature to two case studies. Chapter 
IV will analyze quantitative data about bill referrals and agency interactions to explore 
further the implications of the current oversight of homeland security. Chapter V will 
summarize the conclusions made in the previous chapters and provide a series of 
recommendations as well as a pragmatic implementation plan.  
 
7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relevant literature surrounding the topic of congressional jurisdiction over 
homeland security can be divided into two major categories: the somewhat finite number 
of sources that directly address the topic and those relevant to this topic because they 
address either homeland security policy or congressional oversight’s impact on policy. 
There are perhaps 50 or fewer works that address congressional oversight of homeland 
security and only a portion of those delve into the impact on policy in more than a 
cursory way, furthermore some of these works are quite minor. These works fall into four 
general categories: scholarly articles; public policy organization, think-tank, and 
government commission reports, generally advocating for change; raw data from 
Congress or DHS; and news reports, editorials, and journalistic investigations that 
primarily use that data. On the other side of the split, there are similar types of work; the 
relevant works on congressional oversight and homeland security policy in general tend 
to concentrate on published books and peer reviewed journal articles. The Congressional 
Research Service being the key source on congressional procedure and theory. 
Of the works that look specifically at the congressional oversight of homeland 
security, they overwhelmingly focus on the number of committees involved in oversight 
or the lack of consolidated oversight. It has become somewhat of a clichéd concept in 
discussions about the role of Congress in homeland security to talk about the number of 
oversight committees. The idea that DHS reported to an inordinate number of committees 
was made popular by the 9/11 Commission report.14  
The 9/11 Commission prided itself on seeing its recommendations implemented. 
The literature shows that there are numerous conferences and publications with 
commission members as authors or participants conducting status reviews or report cards 
on the commission’s recommendations. As such, those recommendations that have not 
                                                 
14 The 9/11 Commission, formally the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, was created pursuant to P.L. 107–306. It was chaired by former Governor Thomas H. Kean (R-NJ) 
and vice-chaired by former Representative Lee H. Hamilton (D-IN). Its final report was issued July 22, 
2004. 
8 
been fully implemented are somewhat infamous. Consolidation of congressional 
oversight is often discussed right alongside whether or not the United States fully has the 
ability to “connect the dots” before an incident and utilize interoperable communications 
during an incident, topics that were at the heart of the report’s content and popular 
thinking on the attacks of 9/11. Because of the way it is tied to the 9/11 Commission 
report, nearly every direct piece of literature takes as granted the need to consolidate 
oversight. There are few notable instances where this does not occur, which will be 
discussed in this review. 
A. PRIMARY LITERATURE RESOURCES 
The 9/11 Commission identified four key failures that contributed to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. One of the failures was in counterterrorism policy.15 
Insofar as policy is set or altered through congressional oversight, the commission 
recommended that the United States Congress reform the way it conducts oversight over 
the Department of Homeland Security, citing specifically the number of committees and 
subcommittees that have jurisdiction over DHS: 
Recommendation: Congress should create a single, principal point of 
oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are 
best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this 
department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the 
obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this 
committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan 
staff.16 
The commissioners labeled their congressional reform recommendation as “one 
of the most difficult and important.”17 They recognized any success in achieving a “unity 
of effort in executive management [could] be lost if it is fractured by divided 
congressional oversight.”18 Despite frequent attention on the nature of the problem and 
                                                 
15 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 348–50. 
16 Ibid., 421. 
17 Ibid., 420. 
18 Ibid. 
9 
support for the recommendation’s implementation, it is one of the “major unfinished” 
recommendations on the Commission’s final report.19  
1. Commissions Addressing “Homeland Security” Prior to 9/11 
Beginning in 1999, three so-called “blue ribbon” commissions were formed to 
look at national security, counterterrorism, and preparedness for the twenty-first century. 
The Gilmore Commission, 20  the Hart-Rudman Commission, 21  and the Bremer 
Commission 22  all presciently noted the uncoordinated nature of homeland security 
functions in the executive branch prior to 9/11. Similarly, they noted that congressional 
oversight of those functions was also fractured and recommended a variety of solutions to 
reorganize Congress or streamline oversight through select or joint committees.23  
These three commissions made efforts to identify and quantify how fractured 
oversight was. In June of 2000, the Bremer Commission listed 12 “key” committees (not 
including subcommittees) with oversight responsibility for counterterrorism. 24  In 
February 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission noted, “that counterterrorism and 
information security issues involve nearly two dozen [emphasis in the original] 
                                                 
19 National Security Preparedness Group, Tenth Anniversary Report Card, 10. 
20 The Gilmore Commission, formally named the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, was created by Public Law 105–166. It 
was chaired by former Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore, III and issued five annual reports from 
December 1999 to December 2003. 
21 The Hart-Rudman Commission, formally named the United States Commission on National 
Security/21st Century, was chartered by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen on September 2, 1999. It 
was co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren B. Rudman (R-NH). The commission 
organized its business into three phases, and it issued a report corresponding to each phase as well as 
several other supporting documents between August 1999 and April 2001.  
22 The Bremer Commission, formally named the National Commission on Terrorism, was created 
pursuant to Public Law 105–277. It was chaired by L. Paul Bremer III, former ambassador-at-large for 
counterterrorism, and it published its only report on June 7, 2000. 
23 Michael L. Koempel, Homeland Security: Compendium of Recommendations Relevant to House 
Committee Organization and Analysis of Considerations for the House, and 109th and 110th Congresses 
Epilogue (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32711.pdf . 
24 The Bremer Commission, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism (Washington, 
DC: The National Commission on Terrorism, 2000), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
COUNTERINGTERRORISM/pdf/GPO-COUNTERINGTERRORISM-1-5-3.pdf, 35. 
10 
congressional committees and subcommittees.” 25  In December 2001, the Gilmore 
Commission recommended creating a special committee that should be comprised of 
“relevant . . . committees and subcommittees that currently have cognizance over Federal 
programs and activities to combat terrorism” and lists 24 committees (not including 
subcommittees) that should be represented at a minimum.26 
Each of these commissions was writing prior to the reorganization of the 
executive branch following September 11, 2001. The consolidation they were envisioning 
likely was not going to conduct primary oversight of any one agency, but rather ensure 
that there was a level of consistency to planning, policy and operations in the parts of the 
executive branch that conduct homeland security missions. 
2. Think Tank Reviews 
After 9/11, while the executive branch took action on portions of the 
recommendations of the three counterterrorism commissions, policy advocates continued 
to push Congress to do the same. A 2002 white paper from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies recommended the creation of select committees, one in each house, 
to oversee the proposed Department of Homeland Security.27 It further recommended 
that the committees be comprised of the chair and ranking minority member of 
committees and subcommittees “that now exercise oversight over the various agencies 
that will be consolidated in the new Department of Homeland Security” and lists 34 
House committees and subcommittees and eight Senate committees.28  
                                                 
25 The Hart-Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change—The 
Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Washington, DC: The U.S. 
Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001), http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/phaseiii.pdf, 28. 
26 The Gilmore Commission, Second Annual Report: Toward a National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism (Washington, DC: Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2000), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf, 18, note 28.  
27 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Meeting the Challenges of Establishing a New 
Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002, 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/hamrefinalpaper.pdf, 20.  
28 Ibid. 
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The Homeland Security Act of 200229 was created the Department of Homeland 
Security, principally by merging 22 government organizations that were pulled out in 
whole or in part from other federal departments and agencies.30  At the same time, 
Congress recognized the need to at least consider whether its own structure needed to be 
realigned. The Homeland Security Act includes a “sense of Congress that each House of 
Congress should review its committee structure in light of the reorganization of 
responsibilities within the executive branch.”31  
The creation of DHS provided policy advocates and researchers something 
concrete to measure with regard to how Congress organized its oversight of homeland 
security: how many committees have oversight jurisdiction over the elements that 
became DHS? The Brookings Institution provided the first report, “by the [George W. 
Bush] administration’s count, thirteen full committees in each house, and a total of 88 
committees and subcommittees overall, shared responsibility for overseeing the 
homeland security mission in 2002.”32 
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission repeated the claim that “the leaders of the 
Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88 committees and subcommittees 
of Congress.”33 A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and 
Business Executives for National Security (BENS), released in December 2004, 
confirmed the 88 committees and subcommittees reported by the Brookings Institution 
                                                 
29 Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107–296, 107th Cong. (2002).  
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” 
accessed February 20, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security.    
31 Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107–296, 107th Cong. (2002); §1503 quoted in Michael E. 
O’Hanlon et al., Protecting the American Homeland (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/homeland/newhomeland.pdf, xxviii.  
32 Ibid.  
33 The 9/11 Commission does not provide any source or method for calculating this assertion. Given 
the context and the Brookings report, it is likely it came from the Bush administration. 9/11 Commission, 
The 9/11 Commission Report, 421. 
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and the 9/11 Commission.34  The CSIS/BENS report pushed into new territory with 
regard to measuring oversight. It began to measure change, noting that oversight of DHS 
“shrunk to a ‘mere’ 79 [committees and subcommittees] after the reorganization in the 
108th Congress.”35 In addition to measuring change, the CSIS/BENS study provided a 
comparison: only 36 committees and subcommittees have jurisdiction over the 
Department of Defense. The report also created an enduring image, a spider web like 
diagram (see Figure 1) showing the connection between all 79 committees and the 
various elements of DHS.36  
 
Figure 1.  “Spider web chart” of committee oversight of DHS elements.37 
                                                 
34 Based on its analysis of congressional testimony databases and congressional committee websites. 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and Business Executives for National Security [CSIS/BENS], 
Untangling the Web: Congressional Oversight and the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Business Executives for National Security, 2014), 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/041210_dhs_tf_whitepaper.pdf, 2. 
35 The major reforms in the 108th Congress involved consolidating appropriations responsibilities from 
eight subcommittees to one in each house, and the creation of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. 
If everything else stayed the same, that would mean a reduction of 13 committees and subcommittees, but 
the reduction was only by nine meaning four new subcommittees had jurisdiction. CSIS/BENS, Untangling 
the Web, 2. 
36 CSIS/BENS, Untangling the Web, Appendix A. 
37 Ibid. 
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The 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to consolidate oversight popularized the 
concept of fragmented oversight of DHS. Several task force reports, news articles, and 
statements by 9/11 commissioners highlight the lack of congressional action on this 
recommendation in the months following the commission’s final report. However, 
following the initial interest in this topic, there was a gap in reports on the congressional 
jurisdiction over DHS until late 2007. After the 9/11 Commission had made its 
recommendation there was reason to believe it was beginning to be implemented. The 
CSIS/BENS white paper saw the committees of jurisdiction drop from 88 to 79 with the 
minor reforms made in the 108th Congress.38 With the start of the 109th Congress (2005–
2006), the House elevated the Committee on Homeland Security (CHS) from select to 
standing status and formally outlined its jurisdiction in the House rules. The Senate added 
jurisdiction to the Governmental Affairs Committee to create the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC). While both efforts were partial 
consolidations,39 it appeared that the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation was beginning 
to be implemented. However, data collected by the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs in 
the109th Congress would tell a different story. 
3. Data and Analysis from DHS and Media Coverage 
The DHS Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) tracks many interactions between 
the department and Congress. OLA’s metrics are the official DHS accounting of hearings 
and briefings. 40  DHS began reporting on the number of committees exercising 
                                                 
38 The major reforms were the creation of the second House Select Committee on Homeland Security, 
and consolidation of appropriations subcommittees. 
39 As one example, in both the House and Senate, immigration policy remained in the explicit 
jurisdiction of the judiciary committees. 
40  Briefing metrics do not have the same quality as hearing metrics. There are likely over 100 
legislative affairs professionals across the department that could schedule briefings or other interactions 
that would be counted in the metrics (e.g., conference calls, informal meetings, multiple interactions during 
a multi-day conference or a staff or member of Congress delegation trip). Briefings contained in these 
metrics did occur, but the metrics do not account for every interaction. Other types of interactions such as 
letters, emails, staff requests, phone calls, informal meetings, requests routed through the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) or Government Accounting Office (GAO) are not tracked by DHS Office of 
Legislative Affairs (OLA) or are not tracked in a way as to allow meaningful analysis with regard to 
determining oversight jurisdiction. 
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jurisdiction over DHS based on OLA’s metrics at the conclusion of the 109th Congress.41 
According to DHS analysis, utilizing the agency interaction method for assessing 
jurisdiction, the number of committees exercising jurisdiction in the 109th Congress was 
86,42 higher than the previous congress based on the CSIS/BENS analysis. 
Beginning in 2007, the department began significant efforts, notably including 
Secretary Michael Chertoff, to raise awareness about the level of fragmentation of 
oversight and its effects on operations. The Chairman of the House Committee on 
Homeland Security, Peter King, made a high profile request of the department for 
information on the burden of Congress’s fractured oversight of DHS.43 The response to 
that letter and subsequent releases of data by OLA led to a number of news articles and 
reports utilizing the agency interaction method of measuring oversight. Congressional 
Quarterly (CQ) published a five-part series on congressional oversight of DHS in March 
and April 2008 that interviewed DHS officials and members of Congress. 44  Sarah 
Laskow conducted an in-depth investigation in 2009 for the Center for Public Integrity 
that catalogued just how little had been accomplished in the five years since the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation.45  
With the new analysis for the 110th Congress, which concluded 108 committees 
and subcommittees had jurisdiction, a new round of articles and reports began in 2010 
including ones by National Public Radio,46 the Heritage Foundation,47 the Associated 
                                                 
41 This is the first full Congress for which records were kept. 
42 Michael Chertoff, letter to Peter King, May 25, 2007, http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=683475, 
Exhibit A. 
43 Ibid.   
44 Rob Margetta, “CQ Homeland Security,” Congressional Quarterly (2008).  
45 Sarah Laskow, “Is Congress Failing on Homeland Security Oversight?” Center for Public Integrity, 
July 16, 2009, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2009/07/16/2822/congress-failing-homeland-security-
oversight.  
46 “Who Oversees Homeland Security? Um, Who Doesn’t?,” National Public Radio, July 20, 2010, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128642876.  
47 Paul Rosenzweig, Jena McNeill, and James Jay Carafano, “Stopping the Chaos: A Proposal for 
Reorganization of Congressional Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,” Heritage 
Foundation, accessed November 19, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/stopping-the-
chaos-a-proposal-for-reorganization-of-congressional-oversight-of-dhs.   
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Press,48 and Federal News Radio.49 The 9/11 Commission Chair Kean and Vice Chair 
Hamilton participated two unrelated task forces one in September 201150 and one in 
September 2013, 51  both of which highlighted the lack of action on the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations; the 2013 task force was devoted entirely to 
congressional oversight reform.  
Most of the literature identified the problem in more or less detail but lacked any 
rigorous analysis. It seems the number of oversight committees reported (in some cases 
without giving a full accounting of how they achieved that number) seemed big enough 
to fail the common sense test.   
4. Academic Research  
Timothy Balunis and William Hemphill conducted the first methodical review of 
the DHS jurisdiction topic.52 They analyzed jurisdiction by overlaying House Rule X and 
Senate Rule XXV onto the committee hearings in the 110th Congress that called DHS 
witnesses to testify.53 Additionally, they analyzed committee jurisdiction in the context of 
each hearing and identified the most likely jurisdictional “angle” that the committees 
were using to call each witness.54 One example they offer is a Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works hearing on nuclear power plant safety, suggesting that the 
committee’s jurisdiction over “nonmilitary environmental regulation and control of 
nuclear energy,” provided in Senate Rule XXV, is the “angle” the committee used to 
invite a DHS witness to testify. 
                                                 
48 Alicia Caldwell, “Inside Washington: DHS Most Overseen Department,” May 17, 2011, 
http://homeland.house.gov/news/associated-press-inside-washington-dhs-most-overseen-department.  
49 Keith Biery Golick, “Former National Security Adviser Calls for Streamlined DHS Oversight,” 
Federal News Radio, August 3, 2012, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/473/2976060/Former-national-
security-adviser-calls-for-streamlined-DHS-oversight.  
50 National Security Preparedness Group, Tenth Anniversary Report Card, 10. 
51 Task Force, Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight.  
52 It is unclear what methodology the Bremmer, Hart-Rudman, and Gilmore commissions or the 
CSIS/BENS used to count the number of committees they do not describe it in their reports.  
53 Balunis, and Hemphill, Gordium Revisited.  
54 Ibid., 46. 
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Balunis and Hemphill analyzed all 274 hearings with DHS personnel testifying 
during the 110th Congress at the time of their analysis (2008) and cite the “angle” for all 
committees outside of the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees. They then 
identified the angles that are most often used and label them the “jurisdictional 
battleground,” which allowed them to provide recommendations for committee 
reorganization that will allow for the greatest amount of consolidation. They do consider 
whether the “informational efficiency,” which is the desired goal of consolidation, could 
end up having negative consequences, but ultimately come down on the side of much 
greater consolidation, given the preponderance of the evidence they reviewed.55  
In 2012, Balunis and Hemphill collaborated again to provide yet another quality 
contribution to the literature.56 Mirroring the work of Peter May, Ashley E. Jochim, and 
Joshua Sapotichne57 discussed later in the secondary sources, they apply an economics 
concept known as the Herfindahl index, which is a statistical measure of concentration 
most known for measuring market concentration when assessing horizontal mergers in 
banking and industrial markets.58  They used the index to measure the jurisdictional 
clarity of DHS and compare it to other cabinet departments.59 Based on congressional 
hearings, they analyzed the concentration of jurisdiction for DHS, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Transportation. Balunis and 
Hemphill gave each a score of jurisdictional clarity in the House and Senate. The index 
assigns a value of 0 to 100 based on the Herfindahl index formula: 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 34. 
56 Timothy Balunis, and William Hemphill, “Congress and Homeland Security,” in Congress and the 
Politics of National Security, ed. David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell, 100–120 (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
57 May, Jochim, and Sapotichne, “Constructing Homeland Security,” 285–307. 
58 Stephen A. Rhoades, “The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 79 (1993): 188.  
59 Balunis, and Hemphill, “Congress and Homeland Security,” 111. 
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In this application, a value of 100 would mean one committee held all of the hearings 
over an agency, and a value of 25 would mean four committees had an equal number of 
hearings with agency witnesses.60 
Interestingly, in the 110th Congress, the most recent Congress for which they 
presented data, DHS did not have the lowest jurisdictional clarity. It had greater clarity 
than the Department of Energy in the House and greater clarity than the Department of 
Defense in the Senate. The authors argued that this was misleading and compared the 
agencies’ jurisdictional clarity in their “infant Congress” (i.e., the first full, two-year 
Congress after each cabinet department was created). Using the same measurement 
technique they applied to the 110th Congress, they found DHS did have the lowest level 
of jurisdictional clarity of the four cabinet departments in their infant congresses. Balunis 
and Hemphill use these findings to argue that lack of jurisdictional clarity is not just 
something that all new departments have to suffer through early on, but rather that DHS 
has an exceptionally low level of jurisdictional clarity relative to other new agencies. 
They suggest that this will have long-term policy implications for homeland security. 
Two masters students at the Naval Postgraduate School, Tappan Sen and Manuel 
Gonzalez, have also conducted studies of this topic. In his master’s thesis, Tapan Sen 
reviewed the explicit jurisdiction over DHS and compared it to that of the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community.61 He chronicled the failure of Congress 
to properly oversee intelligence matters and contrasted it to the more rigorous oversight 
of the DOD. He acknowledged the sometimes “overbearing” nature of oversight of DOD 
but noted its relative policy and operational successes.62 He concluded that DHS is also at 
times characterized by “overbearing” oversight, and the continuation of that level of 
oversight should lead to better policy outcomes despite the administrative burdens.63 
                                                 
60 Ibid.  
61 Tapan Sen, “Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security: Help or Hindrance?” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/27903.  
62 Ibid., 53–54. 
63 Ibid., i. 
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Manuel Gonzalez also wrote a master’s thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
attempting to answer the question of why DHS has fractured oversight and why Congress 
has not reformed itself. 64  He identifies political motivations such as home-state, 
contracting, and prestige concerns that contribute to a reluctance of members to give up 
jurisdiction. Moreover, he suggests that committees hold more joint hearings as a solution 
to the problem of conflicting policy direction that is caused by fractured homeland 
security oversight. 
B. SECONDARY SOURCES 
In 2011, Peter May Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne looked at hearing 
data and analyzed congressional testimony, not to identify congressional fragmentation, 
but to assess the homeland security policy regime.65 Their analysis indicated that it was 
“anemic” and suggested that it was “further undermined by congressional institutional 
misalignment.” 66  Their analysis utilized the Herfindahl index to determine how 
concentrated various homeland security policy subsystems were at DHS and to assess the 
extent of the acceptance of the motivating ideas behind homeland security.67  
Walter Oleszek of the Congressional Research Service is widely considered an 
expert on congressional procedure.68  Together with Mark Oleszek, he described the 
history of congressional oversight of DHS.69 In their assessment, they detail the explicit 
jurisdiction and the process by which the rules were changed in early 2005. They provide 
                                                 
64 Manuel Gonzalez, “Going beyond the Water’s Edge: Improving Congressional Oversight for the 
Department of Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 
65 May, Jochim, and Sapotichne “Constructing Homeland Security.” 
66 Ibid., 302. 
67 Ibid., 299.  
68 “Walter Oleszek: A Hill Staffer’s Guide to Congressional History and Habit,” Washington Post, 
March 29, 2009, accessed November 17, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-03-
29/politics/36829565_1_congress-works-congressional-operations-congressional-history.  
69 Mark J. Oleszek, and Walter J. Oleszek, “Institutional Challenges Confronting Congress after 9/11: 
Partisan Polarization and Effective Oversight,” Congress and the Politics of National Security, edited by 
David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 45–67. 
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a counter argument for further consolidation and describe the benefit of “creative 
redundancy.”70 
In his book, Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction, 
David King investigates the way the committees system operates and how inter-
committee conflict is often working behind the scenes in Congress. Some of the major 
ongoing conflicts between committees are the decisions by the House and Senate 
parliamentarians to refer bills to one committee or the other. Where the rules of the 
House and Senate are silent, the precedent created by past referrals governs. King 
describes members of Congress and their staff who seek to grow their jurisdiction into 
new or contested areas of jurisdiction as “policy entrepreneurs.” He argues,  
in citing referral precedents, then, policy entrepreneurs present the 
parliamentarian with their own interpretations of the laws of the House . . . 
policy entrepreneurs fashion interpretations of referral precedents that are 
designed to improve their chances of a favorable referral.71  
Therefore, the common law is always changing and new referrals may indicate who 
actually has jurisdiction over a particular agency or issue.  
There have not been any comprehensive reviews published of DHS congressional 
jurisdiction based on bill referral precedents. The principal reason is that bill referral 
precedent decisions are opaque to everyone except the House and Senate 
parliamentarians. King relays a story about bill referrals in Turf Wars: 
When William Brown was parliamentarian, he kept an old cardboard box 
next to his desk in H-211 of the Capitol Building. The Box held especially 
persuasive letters that offered guiding interpretations of referral precedent. 
When exploring and citing legislative histories, it was the goal of policy 
entrepreneurs to have their versions of the House rules “accepted” into this 
worn box of precedents.72 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 57. 
71 David C. King, Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 107.  
72 Ibid., 109. 
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These reviews likely do exist, but they are carefully guarded. Bill referral 
precedent is mainly of tactical or aspirational importance for the committees trying to 
gain jurisdiction. If a competing committee learns that another committee is planning to 
persuade the parliamentarian to establish a bill referral precedent, they may have time to 
research and establish their own interpretation of the common law. There have been 
several publications of House precedents, including the magnum opus of Lewis Deschler, 
which included descriptions of bill referral precedents, but publications of precedents 
since then have been much less granular.73 
The literature is rife with works that quantify, purchased advertisements, and 
complain about the level of congressional oversight of DHS. There has been some 
discussion about the impacts the current level of oversight has on homeland security, but 
it has not been terribly rigorous. Another general commonality in the literature is the 
respect that people give to the 9/11 Commission recommendation on consolidating 
congressional oversight of homeland security. Ten years have passed since the 
recommendation has been made and about nine since the reforms in the House and 










                                                 
73 Lewis Deshcler, Deschler’s Precedents (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976). 
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III. HOMELAND SECURITY OVERSIGHT BACKGROUND 
A. CONCEPT OF OVERSIGHT 
Congress derives its implicit authority to conduct oversight of the executive 
branch from the U.S. Constitution. From the requirement for Congress to appropriate 
money before the executive branch can spend it, to the advice and consent given by the 
U.S. Senate for presidential appointees, the Congress is expected to play a role in running 
the government beyond simply writing laws.  
There are two main schools of thought on how oversight is generally conducted. 
One is more proactive, constantly following the conduct of the executive branch, which 
will inform future legislation. The other is to react after the fact to curb excesses in 
executive branch activity. Matthew Mccubins and Thomas Schwartz described these two 
general trends as police patrol and fire alarm, respectively. Police patrol calls to mind a 
cop on the beat who is checking in on residents and shop owners when things are fine, 
and who develops a close knowledge of the neighborhood and good relationships with 
those who live and work in it. Fire alarm invokes the image of firefighters responding to 
a fire and investigating the cause. 74  Both may be necessary and could work in 
conjunction; most committees of congress have vested one of their subcommittees with 
the responsibility of conducting investigations suggesting that the committee’s oversight 
function benefits from police patrol, but also an independent group to respond to fire 
alarms.  
Tappen Sen applied the police patrol and fire alarm models to try to determine 
which would produce better oversight for the Department of Homeland Security. He 
determined through case studies that the Department of Defense’s oversight is largely 
characterized by the police patrol model and the intelligence enterprise by the fire alarm 
model. In addition, he concluded that while the fire alarm model to produce some 
noteworthy reforms in the Intelligence Community, the police patrol model often 
                                                 
74 Mathew D. McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols and Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (1984): 166. 
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prevented the Department of Defense from tripping a fire alarm in the first place. Many 
have argued in the literature that since oversight jurisdiction is split among several 
committees that inevitably the oversight will be characterized as fire alarm.75  
It is possible to make a distinction between oversight and legislation, but it is an 
unnecessary one. This research considers all actions directed toward the executive branch 
as a form of oversight. In order to determine what the optimal way for Congress to 
oversee homeland security, it is necessary to be able to measure the current (and past) 
oversight.  
In order to measure more effectively and to have consistency over multiple 
congresses, this thesis will generally treat subcommittees as part of or the same as their 
parent committee. With only two notable exceptions,76 subcommittees are essentially 
agents of their parent committees and should not be thought of as separate entities. 
Subcommittees, their names, chairs and ranking members, and jurisdiction (derived from 
the parent committee’s jurisdiction) change much more frequently than those of the 
parent committees. Subcommittees are essentially organized for the purpose of better 
facilitating the work of the full committee. In the House, subcommittee staff are 
controlled by the chair and ranking member of the full committee and generally share 
office space with the full committee staff. Senate subcommittees (like senators) have 
more independence than their House counterparts and control only a few staff. Treating 
subcommittees as the full committee would make analysis less complex. Those that have 
invested heavily in the agency interaction model of measuring oversight might object to 
this simplification. Treating subcommittees as their parent committee would lower the 
total number of committees, but in doing so it takes a more accurate look at the way 
Congress conducts oversight.  
                                                 
75 Sen, “Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security: Help or Hindrance?”  
76  Appropriations subcommittees act very similar to full committees in most of their oversight 
activities. Each subcommittee is aligned in its jurisdiction with its counterpart it the other chamber with the 
goal of passing one appropriations bill (sometimes one or more supplemental bills as well). The Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (currently part of the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee) has broad jurisdiction to investigate without relying on its parent committee for 
mandate or subpoena power. 
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The vast majority of interactions between agencies and the Hill come from 
briefings (informal meetings, generally with committee staff). These meetings are rarely 
limited to one subcommittee or another, even in the Senate where committees have 
separate subcommittee staff. Furthermore, it would be extremely rare that there would be 
disagreement between subcommittees. Chairs and ranking members of full committees 
often select their subcommittee counterparts because they share a joint vision for that 
subcommittee’s jurisdiction. When disagreements do arise between subcommittees, they 
are likely to be quickly ironed out by the full committee. In general, there is more 
disagreement between the minority and majority members and staff than between the 
subcommittees. This disagreement or differing emphasis likely creates more duplication 
or burden in oversight than any differences between subcommittees (and possibly 
between different committees) and yet is rarely addressed in the literature. It also will not 
be addressed directly in this research, as it is very difficult to find unbiased data sources. 
It is not necessary to over emphasize the role subcommittees play; however, it makes 
logical sense that there would be disagreement between rival political parties than 
between subcommittees that are designated to carry out the work or the full committee.  
Most of the literature relies on a single, very narrow use of one method of 
measurement. This is due, in part, to the fact that it is the simplest way to present the 
available data and because it presents a compelling argument for many groups’ stated 
goals. However, there are other ways to measure and assess the type of oversight, and it 
is possible to expand on the agency interaction method to make it more meaningful, as 
will be shown below.  
B. METHODS OF MEASURING OVERSIGHT 
The literature identifies three major ways to determine which committees have 
jurisdiction over an agency: analyze the agency’s interactions with the Hill;77 survey the 
rules of the House and Senate to determine which committees have been given explicit 
                                                 
77 Hearings are the most formal and visible form of interaction and are generally the basis for agency 
interaction analyses. 
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jurisdiction; or review bill referral precedents.78 This section will detail these methods by 
describing the mechanics of each method and reviewing how they have been utilized 
previously to assess the jurisdiction over DHS. 
1. Agency Interaction 
As was discussed in the literature review, the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation to consolidate oversight popularized the concept of fragmented 
oversight of DHS. Since the commission used the agency interaction model to assess the 
fragmented jurisdiction so did most reports. Notable early instances include the CSIS/
BENS report that introduced the spider web diagram in Figure 1,79 a Washington Post op-
ed in late 2004,80 and an op-ed in the Baltimore Sun by 9/11 Commission Chair Kean and 
Vice Chair Hamilton in June 2005.81  
DHS began reporting on the number of committees exercising jurisdiction over 
DHS based on OLA’s metrics at the conclusion of the 109th Congress.82 The method was 
geared toward updating the numbers used by Brookings Institute, CSIS/BENS, and the 9/
11 Commission—that is tallying up how many committees and subcommittees held a 
hearing with a DHS witness or had a briefing from a DHS official. According to DHS 
analysis, utilizing the agency interaction method for assessing jurisdiction, the number 
committees exercising jurisdiction in the 109th Congress was 86, higher than the previous 
congress based on the CSIS/BENS analysis. 83  During the 110th Congress, 108 
                                                 
78 The authors suggest a fourth way: Reviewing “budget dollars controlled for component programs 
and policy areas.” Given the consolidation of the appropriations subcommittees, this method is not 
particularly relevant to assessing jurisdiction over DHS. Balunis, and Hemphill, “Congress and Homeland 
Security,” 109. 
79 CSIS/BENS, Untangling the Web. 
80 “Homeland Security Oversight,” The Washington Post, December 28, 2004, sec. A18, 
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82 This is the first full Congress for which records were kept. 
83 Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Congressional 
Committees: Congressional Committees that have exercised jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland 
Security in the 109th Congress” (unpublished document, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of 
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committees and subcommittees exercised jurisdiction, and by the 112th Congress, it was 
119.84 
The new analysis for the 110th Congress concluded that 108 committees and 
subcommittees had jurisdiction, 85  triggering a new round of articles and reports 
beginning in 2010, including ones by National Public Radio,86 the Heritage Foundation,87 
the Associated Press,88 and Federal News Radio.89 The 9/11 Commission Chair Kean and 
Vice Chair Hamilton participated two unrelated task forces one in September 201190 and 
one in September 2013 91  that highlighted the lack of action on the commission’s 
recommendations; the 2013 task force was devoted entirely to congressional oversight 
reform.  
Many of the reviews utilizing the agency interaction method identified the 
problem in more or less detail but lacked any formal statistical analysis. In 2011, Peter 
May, Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne looked at hearing data and analyzed 
congressional testimony, not to identify congressional fragmentation, but to assess the 
homeland security policy regime.92 Their analysis indicated that it was “anemic,” and 
suggested that it was “further undermined by congressional institutional misalignment.”93 
Moreover, their analysis utilized the Herfindahl index, which is a statistical measure of 
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request from House Committee on Homeland Security Chair Peter King). Additional documentation is 
available from the author upon request. The level of jurisdiction is calculated by measuring the number of 
committees and subcommittees that held a hearing with a DHS witness, was provided a briefing by DHS 
personnel or directed a post-hearing question for the record (QFR) to DHS. 
85 Office of Legislative Affairs, “DHS Congressional Committees: Congressional.” 
86 “Who Oversees Homeland Security? Um, Who Doesn’t?,” National Public Radio.  
87 Rosenzweig, McNeill, and Carafano, “Stopping the Chaos.” 
88 Caldwell, “Inside Washington: DHS Most Overseen Department.”  
89 Golick, “Former National Security Adviser Calls for Streamlined DHS Oversight.”  
90 National Security Preparedness Group, Tenth Anniversary Report Card. 
91 Task Force, Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight. 
92 May, Jochim, and Sapotichne, “Constructing Homeland Security.” 
93 Ibid., 302. 
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concentration most known for measuring market concentration when assessing horizontal 
mergers in banking and industrial markets.94 They sought to determine how concentrated 
various homeland security policy subsystems were at DHS and to assess the extent of the 
acceptance of the motivating ideas behind homeland security. 
In 2012, Balunis and Hemphill applied the Hefindahl index in a different way.95 
They used it to measure the jurisdictional clarity of DHS and compare it to other cabinet 
departments. 96  Based on congressional hearings, they analyzed the concentration of 
jurisdiction for DHS, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the 
Department of Transportation, and they gave each a score of jurisdictional clarity in the 
House and Senate. Interestingly, in the 110th Congress, the most recent Congress for 
which they presented data, DHS did not have the lowest jurisdictional clarity. DHS had 
greater clarity than the Department of Energy in the House and greater clarity than the 
Department of Defense in the Senate. The authors argued that this was misleading and 
compared the agencies’ jurisdictional clarity in their “infant Congress” (i.e., the first full, 
two-year Congress after each cabinet department was created). Using the same 
measurement technique, they applied to the 110th Congress, DHS did have the lowest 
level of jurisdictional clarity of the four cabinet departments in their infant congresses. 
Balunis and Hemphill use these findings to argue that lack of jurisdictional clarity is not 
just something that all new departments have to suffer through early on, but rather that 
DHS has an exceptionally low level of jurisdictional clarity relative to other new 
agencies. Furthermore, they suggest that this will have long-term policy implications for 
homeland security. 
The agency interaction method is useful to measuring oversight to a certain 
degree, but it is generally limited by the availability of data. Hearings are most often used 
because they are readily available for analysis and because they are public; however, 
hearings are not the most common agency interactions and, given their public nature, 
                                                 
94 Rhoades, “The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,” 188–190.  
95 Balunis, and Hemphill, “Congress and Homeland Security,” 100–120.  
96 Ibid., 111. 
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may not be the most influential on policy. Agencies tend to be defensive and well 
scripted in hearings, and members of Congress have at times been influenced unduly by 
politics. Some studies have used briefings and other interactions (e.g., letters, post-
hearing questions for the record, congressional site visits) to help determine and map the 
committees that have exercised oversight. However, most agency interaction analyses 
have been overly simplistic and utilize a binary measure (i.e., if the committee had one 
interaction it is listed alongside a committee with 600 interactions and a committee 
exercising oversight over on function of DHS is often shown to appear to be exercising 
oversight of the entire department). The reasons for doing this appears to be honest 
enough; it is a complex environment, and researchers and advocates alike were looking 
for a single metric that would explain the situation. 
2. Explicit Jurisdiction 
The U.S. House and Senate each have written rules that govern their operations. 
House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV describe the jurisdiction of each chamber’s 
committees.97 Committees are given explicit jurisdiction over specific policy areas and 
agencies. Therefore, a review of the written jurisdiction in the House and Senate rules 
provides another method by which to measure the jurisdiction over the elements of DHS. 
There are gaps and ambiguities, but reviewing the rules alone does allow for a certain 
level of analysis regarding jurisdiction. For example, oversight of the “organization and 
administration of the Department of Homeland Security” is specifically granted to the 
Committee on Homeland Security (CHS).98 However, certain functions are excluded 
from the jurisdiction of CHS (e.g., immigration policy) and certain elements of DHS are 
                                                 
97 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rules of the House of Representatives,” Government Printing 
Office, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMAN-113/html/HMAN-113-pg432.htm; U.S. Senate, 
“Standing Rules of the Senate,” Government Printing Office, 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/SMAN-
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jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security was agreed to in S Res. 445, 108th Cong. (2004) 
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the Senate,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/SMAN-113/html/SMAN-113-pg166.htm.  
98 U.S. House of Representatives, “House Rule X,” Rules of the House, Clause (j), §2-3.  
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specifically provided to other committees (e.g., the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure has explicit jurisdiction over the Coast Guard).99  
Some of those that analyze the explicit jurisdiction have come to the conclusion 
that Congress has established an appropriate level and system of oversight for DHS. The 
then Chairman of the House Rules Committee, David Dreier, assessed the jurisdiction of 
DHS in 2005 after the elevation of the Committee on Homeland Security from select to 
standing status:  
It creates a primary committee while recognizing the other legitimate 
oversight roles of existing committees. We envision a system of 
purposeful redundancy [emphasis added]. By that, we mean more than one 
level of oversight and an atmosphere in which the competition of ideas is 
encouraged.100 
Three problems arise when attempting to measure jurisdiction based on the House 
and Senate rules. First, some committees have jurisdiction over issues across the entire 
federal government or that are applicable to multiple cabinet departments. For example, 
the Committee on Small Business has jurisdiction over all agencies’ contracting and 
interactions with small businesses;101 and the House Committees on Armed Services and 
Veteran Affairs have some jurisdiction over the U.S. Coast Guard.102 Second, committees 
have jurisdiction with only potential or tangential relation to DHS. For example, the 
House Committee on Financial Services has jurisdiction over public housing, which 
became relevant to DHS only after Hurricane Katrina in 2005.103 Third, the imprecision 
of the terms requires some subjective interpretation and an encyclopedic knowledge of 
the activities of DHS to know if they would apply.  
Much of the scholarly work on this topic has involved some analysis of the House 
and Senate rules as they apply to committee jurisdiction. For example, Balunis and 
                                                 
99 Ibid., Clause (r), §1. 
100 151 Cong. Rec. H14 (daily ed., Jan. 4, 2005) (remarks of David Drier), quoted in Koempel, 
Homeland Security.  
101 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rules of the House of Representatives,” Rule X., Clause (q).  
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Hemphill,104 Tappan Sen,105 and Walter and Mark Oleszek106 all use the rules to aid their 
analysis. They all also used or are aware of the DHS reported figures that utilize the 
agency interaction method; however, in analyzing the explicit jurisdiction, they end up 
with more nuanced conclusions than those that just utilize agency interactions.  
3. Bill Referral Precedent 
The third major way to measure congressional jurisdiction is through the analysis 
of bill referral precedents. Referral precedent is a kind of common law. It is set when a 
committee has a bill or other matter referred to it, based on previous similar bills being 
referred to it or based on the House or Senate parliamentarian’s judgment of a 
committee’s explicit jurisdiction in the House and Senate rules. David King’s research, 
while not related to DHS, is good example from the literature on how this analysis is 
useful.107 He shows the fluid situation of the jurisdiction based on bill referrals; new 
referrals may indicate who actually has jurisdiction over a particular agency or issue, 
even though there are no agency interactions or changes in the rules to measure.  
To illustrate how powerful bill referral precedent can be in setting jurisdiction, it 
was addressed by the speaker of the House of Representatives at the start of the 109th 
Congress to allay fears of committees competing for jurisdiction of elements of DHS: 
“The 109th Congress established the Committee on Homeland Security. The Chair would 
announce that the Speaker’s referrals of measures to the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security of the 108th Congress will not constitute precedent for referrals to the new 
committee.”108 Because the Select Committee on Homeland Security had at least 40 bills 
                                                 
104 Balunis, and Hemphill, Gordium Revisited; Balunis, and Hemphill, “Congress and Homeland 
Security,” 100–120.  
105 Ibid., 53–54. 
106 Oleszek, and Oleszek, “Institutional Challenges Confronting Congress after 9/11,” 45–67. 
107 King, Turf Wars, 107. 
108 151 Cong. Rec, H35 (daily ed., January 4, 2005).  
This was an adoption of the recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 
108th Congress: “No referrals of legislation, executive communication, or any other action taken in the 
108th Congress with regard to the Select Committee on Homeland Security or any other committee of the 
House shall be considered to be a precedent for referrals of any homeland security-related measures in the 
current Congress.” Quoted in Koempel, Homeland Security, Appendix A. 
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referred to it in the 108th Congress, without the above note from the speaker, the 
parliamentarian might have seen those bills as a precedent for referring bills on similar 
topics in the new Congress. The jurisdiction, explicitly provided to CHS in House Rule 
X, was the subject of heavy negotiations, and parties to those negotiations would not 
want to see past bill referrals weaken the deal they had just won. 
There have not been any comprehensive reviews published of DHS congressional 
jurisdiction based on bill referral precedent. The principal reason is that bill referral 
precedent decisions are opaque to everyone except the House and Senate 
parliamentarians. King relays a story about bill referrals in Turf Wars: 
When William Brown was parliamentarian, he kept an old cardboard box 
next to his desk in H-211 of the Capitol Building. The Box held especially 
persuasive letters that offered guiding interpretations of referral precedent. 
When exploring and citing legislative histories, it was the goal of policy 
entrepreneurs to have their versions of the House rules “accepted” into this 
worn box of precedents.109 
These reviews likely do exist, but they are carefully guarded. Bill referral 
precedent is mainly of tactical or aspirational importance for the committees trying to 
gain jurisdiction. If a competing committee learns that another committee is planning to 
persuade the parliamentarian to establish a bill referral precedent, it may have time to 
research and establish its own interpretation of the common law. There have been several 
publications of House Precedents, including the magnum opus of Lewis Deschler, which 
included descriptions of bill referral precedents, but publications of precedents since then 
have been much less granular.110 
It may not be possible to review bill referral precedent arguments, but it is 
possible to review bill referrals. Treating legislation as a form of oversight means that 
analyzing which committees are being referred legislation makes it possible to use bill 
referrals to measure oversight. Bill referrals allow for both qualitative (e.g., why was that 
bill referred) and quantitative review analysis (e.g., how many bills were referred to 
                                                 
109 King, Turf Wars, 109. 
110 Deshcler, Deschler’s Precedents. 
31 
which committees). The weakness in the method is that the rationale for the referral can 
be hidden, because the parliamentarians do not generally make the reason for their 
decision known. 
Each method of measurement will provide some help in understanding the current 
state of homeland security oversight and will allow for analysis of the implications of that 
oversight. Bill referrals and agency interactions will be analyzed on a macro level in 
Chapter V and all three methods will be used to measure and analyze oversight on two 
case studies in Chapter IV. The use of multiple methods of measurement will produce a 
more complete and nuanced view of oversight of homeland security. 
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IV. CASE STUDY REVIEWS 
As shown in the previous chapter, the literature establishes that there are three 
major ways to determine which committees have jurisdiction over an agency: analyze the 
agency’s interactions with the Hill; survey the rules of the House and Senate to determine 
which committees have been given explicit jurisdiction; or review bill referral precedents. 
This section will apply each of the three methods to the following cases to learn more 
about how Congress oversees homeland security.  
A. UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION 
The United States Fire Administration (USFA) was created and established in the 
Commerce Department by Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974.111 In 1979, 
President Carter moved the USFA to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).112 In 2003, USFA was transferred in its entirety to DHS under the Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Directorate. Then, as part of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act, the USFA was sent back to FEMA in 2006.113  
In addition to managing the National Fire Academy, the USFA’s principal 
objective “is to significantly reduce the nation’s loss of life from fire, while also 
achieving a reduction in property loss and non-fatal injury due to fire.”114 It does this 
through data collection, public education, training, and research. USFA has also had a 
significant role in administering the Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program and 
the related Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Grant (SAFER) 
Program. The grant programs were originally administered directly by USFA but have 
moved around inside of DHS since 2004; however, “congressional appropriations reports 
                                                 
111 Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, P.L. 93–498, 93rd Cong. (1974). 
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have consistently instructed DHS to maintain USFA involvement in the grant 
administration process for AFG and SAFER grants.”115 
1. Agency Interaction 
A review of hearing data from 2005 through 2012 shows that officials of the U.S. 
Fire Administration have testified before Congress six times, three of which were 
confirmation hearings. Additionally, there was a hearing on the Assistance to Firefighters 
Grant Program with a witness from FEMA’s Grants Program Directorate (see Table 1).116  
Measuring jurisdiction based on hearings alone shows that the Science Committee 
has jurisdiction over USFA in the House and that jurisdiction in the Senate is split 
between the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) and the 
Commerce Science and Transportation Committee (CS&T). It is possible to make a 
conclusion regarding jurisdiction over the USFA using hearing data, but given that no 
committee held more than one hearing on USFA in any Congress during this period, the 
conclusion is not terribly valid.  
Table 1.   USFA Hearings 109th–112th Congress 
Date Committee Hearing Title DHS Witness 
3/15/07 Senate Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs 
Committee 
To Consider the 
Nomination of Gregory 
Cade to be the 
Administrator of the U.S. 
Fire Administration 
Gregory Cade 
10/2/07 House Science and 
Technology Committee 
Subcommittee on 
Technology and Innovation 
The United States Fire 
Administration 
Reauthorization: 
Addressing the Priorities 





7/8/09 House Committee on 
Science and Technology, 
Subcommittee on 






                                                 
115 Ibid., 7. 
116 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Legislative Affairs, “Hearing Schedule Outlook,” 
109th–112th Cong. Unpublished but available from the author. 
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Date Committee Hearing Title DHS Witness 




8/5/09 Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 
To consider the 
nomination of Kelvin 
Cochran to be 
Administrator, U.S. Fire 
Administration—FEMA 
Kelvin Cochran 
12/17/09 Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 
Subcommittee on Consumer 
Protection, Product Safety, 
and Insurance  
Carbon Monoxide 
Poisoning: Sounding the 




10/5/11 Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 
To consider the 
nomination of Ernest 
Mitchell Jr. as FEMA’s 
U.S. Fire Administration 
(USFA) Administrator  
Ernest Mitchell, 
Jr. 
5/17/12 House Committee on 
Science, Space, and 
Technology, Subcommittee 
on Technology and 
Innovation 
Working for a Fire Safe 
America: Examining 







2. Explicit Jurisdiction 
A review of House and Senate rules to determine which committee or committees 
have jurisdiction over the U.S. Fire Administration proved to be inconclusive. Neither set 
of rules explicitly references USFA, fire protection,117 or firefighters.118 In the House, 
USFA’s parent agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure based on its 
                                                 
117 Except on merchant marine vessels under the jurisdiction of the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure. 
118 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rules of the House of Representatives;” U.S. Senate, “Standing 
Rules of the Senate.” Jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security was agreed to in S Res. 445, 
108th Cong. (2004). “Non-statutory Standing Orders and Regulations Affecting the Business of the 
Senate,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/SMAN-113/html/SMAN-113-pg166.htm.  
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jurisdiction related to “federal management of emergencies and natural disasters.”119 
However, it could also be argued that CHS has jurisdiction over USFA, owing to its role 
in overseeing “functions of the Department of Homeland Security relating to . . . 
domestic preparedness for and collective response to terrorism.”120 In the Senate, FEMA 
falls under the jurisdiction of HSGAC with the exception of “the National Flood 
Insurance Act of 1968, or functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
related thereto.”121 USFA is part of FEMA and has no relation to the National Flood 
Insurance Program, so it falls under the jurisdiction of HSGAC. It is important to note 
that this analysis does not align with the view of USFA’s jurisdictional scheme assessed 
in this thesis using the analysis of its hearing appearances. 
3. Bill Referrals 
Both the House and Senate have procedures for referring bills to committees that 
are based on the jurisdiction outlined in House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV. 122 
However, when the substance of the bill is not clearly covered by the delineated 
jurisdiction of one committee or another, the parliamentarian either refers the bill to 
whichever committee is most closely associated with the subject unless bills on that or a 
similar subject have been referred in the past to certain committees. In this case, the 
parliamentarians rely on bill referral precedents to make decisions over which committee 
or committees to refer the bill.123  
 
                                                 
119 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rules of the House of Representatives,” Rule X, Clause (1), § (r). 
120 Ibid., § (j). 
121 S Res. 445, 108th Cong.; “Non-statutory Standing Orders and Regulations Affecting the Business 
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122 Roger H. Davidson, Walter J. Oleszek, and Thomas Kephart, “One Bill, Many Committees: 
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3–28; Judy Schneider, Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the Senate (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2008). 
123 Technically, the duty lies with the speaker of the House and the presiding officer of the Senate, but 
it has been delegated to the respective parliamentarians. 
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A review of referrals of legislation directly tied to USFA, including the legislation 
that created it in 1974, shows a third picture of the jurisdiction over the Fire 
Administration (see Table 2). 124  The Committee on Science consistently holds 
jurisdiction over USFA in the House. This can be simply explained by bill referral 
precedent—the House Committee on Science was referred the original bill in 1973 and 
all of its reauthorizations since.125 If another committee tries to claim jurisdiction over 
USFA, the Science Committee has a very strong case to make to the parliamentarian on 
the basis of bill referral precedent. In the Senate, there is a strong precedent of referral to 
the Senate Commerce Committee through the 108th Congress; however, in the 110th 
Congress, the parliamentarian began referring USFA authorization bills to HSGAC. The 
referrals alone do not explain why. Instead, the parliamentarian would have been 
constrained by Senate Resolution (S. Res.), 445, beginning in the 109th Congress, in 
determining that USFA and legislation affecting it now fell under the jurisdiction of 
HSGAC; specific written delineation of jurisdiction overrules bill referral precedent. 
Table 2.   Bill referrals relating to USFA 









Control Act of 1974 P.L. 93–498 
Science and 
Astronautics 12/17/73 Commerce 5/9/73 
Fire Administration 
Authorization Act of 




United States Fire 
Administration 
Reauthorization Act 




United States Fire 
Administration 
Reauthorization Act 







                                                 
124 Library of Congress, “Bills, Resolutions,” Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html. 
This committee was also called the House Committee on Science from the 104th to 109th Congress, and the 
House Committee on Science and Technology during the 110th and 111th Congresses. 
125 Ibid. 
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United States Fire 
Administration Re-
authorization Act of 









Combing explicit jurisdiction and bill referrals indicates that in the Senate, CS&T 
does not have jurisdiction over USFA; however, the review of hearing activity shows that 
it conducted a hearing with the U.S. fire administrator in 2009. Analysis conducted by 
DHS would count this interaction as two additional committees of jurisdiction because it 
would count the parent committee and the subcommittee. The agency interaction method 
is designed to be objective but it tends inflate the number of committees with jurisdiction. 
For example, the 2009 hearing on Carbon Monoxide Poisoning: Sounding the Alarm on a 
Silent Killer is not an oversight hearing over any function of the Department of 
Homeland Security or even over a homeland security issue. The subcommittee’s 
invitation of U.S. Fire Administrator Kelvin Cochran would seem to have been made 
because of his personal expertise regarding the dangers of carbon monoxide and because 
he represented, on a federal level, firefighters around the country who are involved in 
keeping the public safe from that danger. The administrator could have declined the 
invitation, but he did not; perhaps he was thinking about his responsibility “to educate the 
public and overcome public indifference as to fire, fire prevention, and individual 
preparedness.”126  
This is where the concept of homeland security as a multidisciplinary field makes 
jurisdictional overlap not simply a matter of recalcitrant committee chairmen engaging in 
dangerous turf battles. Simply because firefighters have a distinct role in homeland 
security, it does not mean every mission they have is a homeland security mission. 
Accidental carbon monoxide poisoning is not a homeland security issue, and it would be 
inefficient for the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to use its 
                                                 
126 Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 as amended, P.L. 93–498, 93rd Cong. (1974). 
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time considering it; similarly it could be considered a failure of Congress if the Consumer 
Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance subcommittee did NOT consider it.  
In the House, the picture of oversight of USFA is also not immediately clear. 
Since there is generally no public explanation provided when bills are referred to 
committees, researchers have limited information available to them in attempting to 
determine what the jurisdiction of committees is based on. 127  For instance, the 
parliamentarian may be swayed by an argument of bill referral precedent or an 
interpretation of the rules. Additionally, referral could be determined by a formal or 
informal or ad hoc or permanent agreement between the most likely committees to 
receive referral.128 One example related to USFA is the referral of bills in the House that 
affect the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program.  
On April 1, 2004, the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Reauthorization Act of 
2004 was referred to the House Committee on Science, seemingly in line with their long 
recognized jurisdiction over the USFA, despite the fact that the administration of the 
AFG program had recently been transferred to the DHS Office of Domestic 
Preparedness. Then on May 11, 2004, the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 
2004, which included provisions related to the AFG Program, was referred to the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security and four other committees, including House Science 
Committee (presumably because it addressed the AFG program). The Fire Grants 
Reauthorization Act of 2009 was referred jointly to the House Science and Homeland 
Security Committees.129 Because of the speaker’s note at the start of the 109th Congress, 
we must assume that the 2009 referral to CHS is not because of the precedent of the 
Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2004 referral. However, it is not clear if 
the joint referral was because the House Science Committee asserted its referral 
                                                 
127 Some committees publish annual reports describing their legislative work for the session, there is 
sometimes an accounting of the mechanics of bill referrals in those documents, but they are not a complete 
justification. 
128 Schneider, Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the Senate. 
129 Library of Congress, “Bills, Resolutions,” Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html  
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precedent on AFG to the house parliamentarian, who would otherwise have provided 
referral to CHS because of its delineated jurisdiction, or vice versa.130 
Oversight of the USFA shows that there are significant historical connections 
between certain committees and parts of DHS. The fire services and fire science are not 
necessarily a part of homeland security despite the fact that first responders, particularly 
those trained to handle hazardous materials, are a vital part of homeland security. While 
the homeland security committees may want some say in how the USFA prioritizes 
preparedness for threats to the homeland, they may not be best suited to oversee other 
missions of the USFA. 
B. HURRICANE KATRINA OVERSIGHT 
According to the federal government’s official lessons learned report, “Hurricane 
Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history.”131 In addition, it was 
the most deadly in nearly 80 years, and it was the worst storm since the advent of the 
Internet, 24-hour cable news, and the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. The path of the storm was wide, and the flood damage combined with the 
destructive winds crippled infrastructure on the regional level.132 Having avoided any 
major terrorist attacks or plots since 2001, the all-hazards approach to homeland security 
was given its first major challenge in responding to Katrina. Congressional oversight of 
the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina was extensive with a high number of 
hearings and an extremely high amount of legislation introduced.  
1. Agency Interaction 
Congressional oversight can come in many forms. For example, investigations of 
incidents of national significance and political scandals are a major activity of Congress 
and the American public has become familiar with congressional investigations. Often 
they include or culminate in nationally televised hearings and bring lots of publicity to 
                                                 
130 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rules of the House of Representatives,” Rule X, Clause 1, § (j). 
131 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2006), http://www.floods.org/PDF/Katrina_Lessons_Learned_0206.pdf, 5–7.  
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members on the committees. Congressional hearings on contentious issues have made 
their way into popular culture. For example, the 1963 hearings by the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations into the Italian mafia were dramatized in the movie The 
Godfather Part II.  
A variety of motivations are likely to lead committee chairs to call a hearing on an 
issue of national significance: an earnest desire to investigate the circumstances and 
provide constructive changes to improve the government; political gain by pointing out 
flaws in an administration of an opposing political party; seeking the spotlight to advance 
their own careers; or staking a claim on jurisdiction over an issue in competition with 
other committees. Staking out a claim of jurisdiction is a particularly powerful force in 
complex issues.133 Committees will explore how the issue under their jurisdiction was 
impacted, ignored, etc. Hurricane Katrina hit at an unsteady time for oversight 
jurisdiction in the Congress, and, combined with the other motivations, it can be expected 
that Katrina brought into full relief all the contours of congressional jurisdiction 
surrounding it. In this way, looking at the congressional oversight of Katrina is a good 
case study of jurisdiction in that it drew out all possible committees of oversight. 
Furthermore, Hurricane Katrina was so destructive that it had ripple effects in many areas 
of government and serves to highlight the complexity of this area of the homeland 
security mission.  
Hurricane Katrina dominated DHS oversight in the 109th Congress. Even though 
the hurricane hit almost a third of the way through the Congress, it accounted for over 13 
percent of all hearings in the 109th Congress, averaging over a hearing per week. From 
September 2005 through the end of 2006, DHS provided witnesses to 46 hearings before 
14 different committees directly related to Hurricane Katrina or some aspect of the 
response or recovery.134 Table 3 shows the number of hearings by committee.  
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Table 3.   DHS Hurricane Katrina hearings by committee 
Committee Number of 
Hearings 
House Appropriations Committee 1 
House Energy & Commerce Committee 2 
House Financial Services Committee 5 
House Government Reform Committee 3 
House Armed Services 1 
House Committee on Homeland Security 3 
House Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina 
6 
House Committee on Transportation & 
Infrastructure  
3 
Senate Appropriations Committee 2 
Senate Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs 
Committee 
2 
Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation 
Committee 
1 
Senate Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs Committee 
15 
Senate Small Business & Entrepreneurship 1 
Senate Special Committee on Aging 1 
Total 46 
 
The hearings listed in Table 3 may not necessarily be all the hearings related to 
Hurricane Katrina and homeland security; however, the list employs the DHS record 
criteria, which requires that a hearing include a DHS official as a witness. This threshold 
provides a standard baseline for measurement and reasonably bounds those hearings that 
can be considered oversight of homeland security. However, outside of these criteria, 
there were additional hearings from the committees listed in Table 3 and hearings in other 
committees directly related to Hurricane Katrina. These included, for example, a March, 
2006 hearing of the Committee on Natural Resources, The Impact of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita on the National Wildlife Refuge System, that examined the damage to the refuge 
areas and what the potential costs were, how urgently the damage needed to be addressed 
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and any regulatory or legislative changes needed.135 That hearing did not include a DHS 
witness and did not focus on homeland security issues. However, the topic of wildlife 
refuge areas, such as wetlands and their properties of “controlling and mitigating floods,” 
thus protecting coastal communities, were discussed in written testimony. Prevention and 
mitigation are key homeland security concepts; however, as they relate to protecting 
people and infrastructure, they were only ancillary topics in this hearing.136 
While it is clear that several Hurricane Katrina related hearings are not related to 
DHS activities, it is also reasonable to question whether all DHS functions are homeland 
security related. Just as reviews of military contracting procedures in a war zone are not 
necessarily oversight of national security functions, reviews of FEMA contracting 
practices during hurricane recovery are not necessarily oversight of homeland security. 
These may more appropriately be considered oversight of government management. The 
fact that the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has 
jurisdiction over government management generally has likely led to a greater number of 
DHS witnesses at hearings where the committee is looking at one practice government-
wide. Hearings that may appear to be government management oversight may also have a 
homeland security impact, such as waste, fraud, and abuse of recovery resources impacts 
the recovery. A pair of HSGAC hearing titles make that argument Hurricane Katrina: 
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Worsen the Disaster (March 8, 2006) and FEMA’s 
Manufactured Housing Program: Haste Makes Waste (April 21, 2006).  
Given the way congressional rules divide jurisdiction, the number of hearings is 
likely lower than it could have been. The magnitude of the disaster, the ineffective 
federal, state, and local response, and the unprecedented size of the recovery effort 
needed, led Democrats in the House to seek an independent commission to investigate it. 
While Congress has the authority and expertise to investigate major incidents, many 
congressional Democrats felt that with Republicans leading the committee investigations 
                                                 
135 The Impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the National Wildlife Refuge System: Hearing 
before the Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Fisheries and Oceans, United States Senate, 
109th Cong. (2006), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg26654/html/CHRG-109hhrg26654.htm. 
136 Ibid.  
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(by virtue of having majorities in both Houses of Congress in the 109th Congress) would 
whitewash the inquiry in favor of the Republican administration. Instead, they argued for 
an independent commission, similar to the 9/11 Commission, which had popular support 
at the time.137 This effort never got off the ground, and, despite the popular support, there 
was not a natural constituency like the 9/11 Victims’ Families to anchor a lobbying 
effort. 138  House Republicans responded to the pressure by instead creating a select 
committee, the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina less than three weeks after the levees were breached.139 
While “bipartisan” was in the name of the committee, it was created by a largely party 
line vote 218 to188.140  Having sought an investigatory panel independent from the 
Republican controlled Congress, Democrats largely boycotted the panel (House 
Democratic Leadership did not appoint any members, but two Democrats whose districts 
were impact by the storm were reported to have participated in some proceedings: Gene 
Taylor of Mississippi and Charlie Melancon of Louisiana).141 One might assume that the 
House created the select committee because it recognized that oversight was fractured 
between several committees; however, this does not seem to be the overriding reason. In 
the floor debate over passing the resolution to create the select committee, there is no 
mention of the divided or overlapping jurisdiction of the standing committees of the 
House—rather it is almost entirely focused on whether or not the select committee will 
provide an adequate level of oversight versus an independent commission.142 
                                                 
137 Richard Morin, “Bush Approval Rating at All-Time Low,” The Washington Post, September 12, 
2005, sec. Politics, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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138 Philip Shenon, The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation (New York: 
Twelve, 2008), 11. 
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140 House roll call vote 475 in 109th Cong. “Final Vote Results For Roll Call 475,” accessed February 
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141 Carl Hulse, “Louisiana Lawmakers Propose $250 Billion Recovery Package,” The New York 
Times, September 23, 2005, sec. Washington, 
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At the beginning of the 109th Congress (January 2005), the House amended its 
rules to create a standing Committee on Homeland Security, in part as a response to  
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation. At the time and certainly still immediately 
following Hurricane Katrina, there was dissent over the wisdom of placing FEMA within 
DHS through the Homeland Security Act of 2002.143 Because of this, those that oversaw 
FEMA in Congress have been reluctant to turn over of jurisdiction to the Committee on 
Homeland Security. Some have suggested there is a lot of money related to FEMA with 
disaster assistance payments and the vast majority of DHS’s grant dollars. 144  Even 
without considering the money involved, it would not make sense for a committee chair 
to allow for jurisdiction of FEMA to move to the Committee on Homeland Security if he 
or she intended to try to strip it back out of the Homeland Security Department. There is a 
long history of FEMA being overseen by the House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure. The rules of the House had just changed in 2005 but some, including the  
9/11 commissioners, did not feel that it fully implemented the recommendation. In this 
way, the select committee actually prevented a fight over jurisdiction. With the select 
committee in place, there would not to be an effort by any of the three committees most 
likely to investigate Hurricane Katrina to stake out jurisdiction, which could have 
increased duplication. Instead, the three competing committees would simply hold a few 
hearings related to the other aspects of their jurisdiction or long running issues that 
floated up after the select committee was done. As it was, beginning in 2007, the House 
Homeland Security Chairman King and DHS Secretary Chertoff began to look at ways to 
publicize the burden of oversight; without the select committee, that moment could have 
come sooner.  
2. Explicit Jurisdiction 
Another method to assess oversight is to review the relevant House and Senate 
rules and orders that provide explicit jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over Hurricane Katrina 
                                                 
143 151 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. September 15, 2005), H7968 (Rep. Alcee Hastings, Remarks in the 
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144 Gonzalez, “Going beyond the Water’s Edge,” 50. 
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as written in the rules of the House and Senate is complex. The follow-on effects of a 
storm of that magnitude spread to almost every federal cabinet agency and many sectors 
of the economy. The scale of the disaster combined with the broad scope of homeland 
security makes it challenging to review the rules and find clauses that could NOT 
reasonably connect committees to the disaster and aspects of the disaster to the concept of 
homeland security. Nominees for Senate-confirmed executive branch positions are asked 
a question with perhaps unintended consequences: “Do you agree without reservation to 
respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify before any duly constituted 
Committee of Congress if you are confirmed [emphasis added]?”145 To overcome the 
challenge of how to scope the review of the rules, this review examines the rules of the 
committees that held hearings with DHS witnesses (see Table 3). Table 4 outlines the 
clauses of House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV of those committees. 
 
                                                 
145 Nomination of Hon. Michael Chertoff to be Secretary of Homeland Security: Hearing before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 109th Cong., 18 (2005), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg20170/pdf/CHRG-109shrg20170.pdf. 
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Table 4.   Committee jurisdiction as provided by House and Senate rules. 
House  




(1) the development, coordination, and execution by 
local, state, and federal authorities of emergency 
response plans and other activities in preparation for 
Hurricane Katrina; and 
H. Res 437 109th 
Congress 
  (2) the local, state, and federal government response to 
Hurricane Katrina.  




(1) Overall homeland security policy.  
  (2) Organization and administration of the Department 
of Homeland Security. 
 
  Functions of DHS related to:  
        (C) Integration, analysis, and dissemination of 
homeland security information. 
 
          (D) Domestic preparedness for and collective 
response to terrorism. 
 
          (E) Research and development.  
Committee on 
Government Reform 
(6) Overall economy, efficiency, and management of 
government operations and activities, including Federal 
procurement.  
 
  (11) Relationship of the Federal Government to the 
States and municipalities generally. 
 
  (12) Reorganizations in the executive branch of the 
Government. 
 
Committee on (3) Financial aid to commerce and industry (other than  
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Financial Services transportation). 
  (4) Insurance generally.   
  (8) Public and private housing.  
  (10) Urban development.   
Transportation and 
Infrastructure 
(1) Coast Guard, including lifesaving service . . .   
  (2) Federal management of emergencies and natural 
disasters.  
 
  (3) Flood control and improvement of rivers and 
harbors. (4) Inland waterways.  
 
  (14) Oil and other pollution of navigable waters, 
including inland, coastal, and ocean waters.  
 
  (15) Marine affairs, including coastal zone management, 
as they relate to oil and other pollution of navigable 
waters.  
 
  (16) Public buildings and occupied or improved grounds 
of the United States generally.  
 
  (17) Public works for the benefit of navigation, 
including bridges and dams (other than international 
bridges and dams).  
 
  (20) Transportation, including . . . transportation safety 
(except automobile safety and transportation security 
functions of the Department of Homeland Security), 














House Armed Forces 
Committee 
(2) Common defense generally.  
  (4) The Department of Defense generally, including the 











Matters relating to the . . .(1) Department of Homeland 
Security, except matters relating to, the Coast Guard . . . 
[or] the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 or 
functions of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency related thereto. 
Standing orders 
of the Senate Sec. 
82 
(2)(B) Studying the efficiency, economy, and 
effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the 
Government; 
 
Special Committee on 
Aging 
(b)(1)Any and all matters pertaining to problems and 
opportunities of older people 
Standing orders 
of the Senate Sec. 
83.1 






8. Financial aid to commerce and industry. 
12. Public and private housing (including veterans 
housing). 
 
14. Urban development and urban mass transit. 
Appropriations 
Committee 









1. Coast Guard.   
3. Communications.   
Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship  
(b) Study and survey by means of research and 







The Select Committee in the House has the most obvious and clear authority to 
investigate the disaster. While jurisdiction over “Federal Management of Emergencies 
and Natural Disasters” is given to the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, this does not preclude other committees from conducting oversight of various 
aspects of the disaster. Congressional committee jurisdiction is often not mutually 
exclusive; it is explicit but not unambiguous. There was some overlap in the case of 
Hurricane Katrina oversight. In the House, two committees used their jurisdiction to hold 
hearings on federal contracting in the recovery, two committees held hearings generally 
on waste, fraud, and abuse, and two committees held hearings on interoperable 
communications. Reviewing the 46 hearings alongside the House and Senate rules shows 
that the committees did not generally stray from their jurisdiction. For example, the 
House Financial Services Committee only held hearings on the Flood Insurance Program 
and housing issues (see Table 5), which was in line with their jurisdiction as provided by 
the House rules.  
Table 5.   Hearings related to Hurricane Katrina held by the House Committee on 
Financial Services 2005–2006  
Date Hearing Title or Subject DHS Witness 
10/20/05 Management and 
Oversight of the National 
Flood Insurance Program 
David Maurstad, EP&R 
12/8/05 Katrina Housing David Garratt, 
Acting Director Recovery 
Division FEMA 
3/9/06 Gulf Coast Rebuilding Don Powell, Hurricane Czar 
(Federal Reconstruction 
Coordinator) 
1/14/06 Field hearing entitled 
“Housing Options in the 
Aftermath of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita.” 
Mr. James N. (Nick) Russo, 
FCO, FEMA DHS 
1/13/06 Housing needs in the 
aftermath of hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita and 
Scott Wells, Federal 
Coordinating Officer for DR-
1603-LA, FEMA 
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Date Hearing Title or Subject DHS Witness 
various options available 
for reconstruction 
 
The only reason it is accurate to say that the House Committee on Financial 
Services has jurisdiction over DHS is because the flood insurance program and disaster 
related housing were made part of DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 when 
FEMA was transferred to DHS. In that government reorganization, disaster housing and 
rebuilding could just as logically have been transferred to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), which is a partner with FEMA on housing issues and whose 
officials testified on Katrina rebuilding multiple times before the House Financial 
Services Committee during this same period. The Flood Insurance Program, which was 
established in 1968 within HUD and transferred to FEMA in 1979, could have been 
transferred back to HUD or to the Treasury Department, which oversees many insurance 
programs, including one associated with homeland security (the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program). Recovery from a disaster is certainly a homeland security function, 
but the Flood Insurance Program may not be. FEMA and HUD split responsibilities on 
housing after a disaster (and insuring against floods), and it seems to make sense for 
FEMA to have some role in housing, particularly to meet immediate needs, but the 
division of those efforts could be made in any number of ways that make sense or drive 
efficiencies. However, it does not necessarily make sense to divide oversight of those 
issues between congressional committees.  
In fact, when transferring jurisdiction of FEMA to the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, the Senate specifically excluded the National Flood 
Insurance Program from HSGAC’s oversight, leaving it with the Senate Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. Housing and insurance issues are very different 
from homeland security issues. The 9/11 Commission envisioned the homeland security 
committees as having professional staffs with expertise in homeland security. If the 
homeland security committees were given jurisdiction over flood insurance or housing 
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generally, either they would do a poor job overseeing the technical aspects of those 
issues, or they would need to transfer resources away from homeland security.  
It is possible to learn something from the fact that the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee held a hearing, entitled “Guarding against Waste, Fraud, and 
Abuse in Post-Katrina Relief and Recovery: The Plans of Inspectors General,” at which 
DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner testified. The committee only has jurisdiction 
over DHS as it applies to communications. Nevertheless, the committee held a general 
oversight hearing regarding government spending with a DHS witness. This is illustrative 
of a larger phenomenon: invitations to testify are not necessarily turned downed due to 
lack of jurisdiction. While TSA notably refused to testify before the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, other DHS components have yet to be so 
bold.146 In the case of the House Energy and Commerce Katrina Hearing, the chair even 
recognized that DHS is outside the committee’s “core jurisdiction.”147 
Inspectors general (IG) and other oversight officials have a special relationship 
with Congress. Often, they provide draft reports to Congress and coordinate the release of 
their reports with Congress to provide mutually beneficial press coverage. For the 
members of Congress this relationship is an opportunity to be independently validated in 
pointing out scandal. While good executive branch leaders attempt to cultivate strong 
relationships on the Hill, a strong trusting relationship based on integrity is critical to 
success as an IG. The counterpoint to this was the scandal caused by DHS acting 
Inspector General Chuck Edwards over accusations that he had personal ethical issues 
                                                 
146 Andrea Stone, “John Mica Has No Legal Power over TSA, but Pushes the Jurisdictional 
Boundaries,” Huffington Post, October, 10, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/29/john-mica-
tsa_n_1064438.html.   
147 Guarding against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Post-Katrina Relief and Recovery: The Plans of 
Inspectors General: Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. (2005), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg24250/html/CHRG-
109hhrg24250.htm.  
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and collaborated with politically appointees at DHS on some matters in a bid to become 
the permanent IG.148  
If an IG is not seen as having uncompromising integrity and is not responsive to 
Congress and the theatrics of hearings, he or she is unlikely to be effective. By agreeing 
to participate in a hearing outside the “core jurisdiction” of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, Richard Skinner was paying the committee a courtesy it was not entitled to, 
and he was also participating in a show with mutually beneficial publicity for the 
members of Congress and the work of his office. This is not a bad thing, but it may be 
indicative of many hearings in which DHS witnesses participate. Very rarely do DHS 
officials refuse to participate in hearings because of lack of jurisdiction. The risks of 
alienating a committee or a powerful member are likely too great. Additionally, since 
jurisdiction is rarely black and white, nearly every committee of Congress could find 
something within its jurisdiction to get some piece of DHS; very few would be in their 
“core jurisdiction,” but this begins to look more and more like a product of the breadth of 
the DHS mission set, rather than a flaw in the way Congress is organized.  
3. Bill Referrals 
The last method to review oversight in this case study is to review how bills are 
referred to various committees. As was identified in the last section, in some cases it is 
clear from the rules that bills pertaining to certain subjects are referred to specific 
committees; in other cases, the parliamentarian makes a determination based on the 
contents of the bill, or a previously established precedent is used. For example, a plain 
language reading of the rules of the Senate does not provide jurisdiction over flood 
insurance to the Senate Banking Committee; however, through bill referral precedent, 
flood insurance is firmly within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the same bill can be 
referred to more than one committee, either because the bill includes multiple unrelated 
or loosely related issues or because the issue crosses jurisdictional lines. The Library of 
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Congress maintains records of all bills and resolutions introduced in Congress and 
assigns each bill one of 33 policy area terms.149 There were 264 bills or resolutions 
introduced in the 109th Congress that were tagged with the subject emergency 
management.150 In addition, 213 were introduced after August 23, 2005. In the previous 
10 congresses, there were never more than 90 emergency management bills or resolutions 
introduced; the average per Congress was 41.7 bills and resolutions. As such, it is fair to 
assume that most of the bills in this group were in reaction to Hurricane Katrina (see 
Table 6). 
Table 6.   Number and percentage of referrals of emergency management bills and 
resolutions introduced by committee, 109th Congress 
House Committee Number of 
Referrals 
Percentage 
Transportation and Infrastructure 92 31.3% 
Homeland Security 60 20.4% 
Energy and Commerce 38 12.9% 
Financial Services 17 5.8% 
Judiciary 11 3.7% 
Oversight and Government Reform 11 3.7% 
Ways and Means 11 3.7% 
Science, Space, and Technology 10 3.4% 
Education and the Workforce 8 2.7% 
Budget 6 2.0% 
Natural Resources 6 2.0% 
Agriculture 5 1.7% 
Intelligence (Permanent) 5 1.7% 
Armed Services 3 1.0% 
Foreign Affairs 3 1.0% 
Small Business 3 1.0% 
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Appropriations 2 0.7% 
Rules 2 0.7% 
House Administration 1 0.3% 
Total House 294 100.0% 
Senate Committee Number of 
Referrals
Percentage 
Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs 
73 69.5% 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 7 6.7% 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 6 5.7% 
Environment and Public Works 5 4.8% 
Judiciary 4 3.8% 
Energy and Natural Resources 3 2.9% 
Finance 3 2.9% 
Appropriations 2 1.9% 
Foreign Relations 1 1.0% 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 1 1.0% 
Total Senate 105 100.0% 
 
Table 6 shows a similar picture of the fault lines of Hurricane Katrina oversight 
when compared to the agency interaction analysis. In the Senate, the Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee dominates, while in the House, there is a 
distribution mainly across four committees. Since the House Select Committee had no 
legislative authority, analyzing bill referrals shows the relative share of jurisdiction of the 
committees in the House that cannot be clearly seen by looking at hearings, and this 
removes any impact that there might be from agencies attending hearings as a courtesy.  
The use of aggregated data on bills has certain limitations. For instance, the distribution 
of bill referrals is based on how many of each kind of bill are introduced. That is, if a 
flood of different bills is introduced to make minor changes to the Flood Insurance 
Program, but there is only one consensus bill introduced that reorganizes emergency 
management within FEMA and DHS, the Banking/Financial Services committees may 
appear to have a larger share of emergency management oversight. It is possible to screen 
the data for noise caused by minor or unpopular bills by looking at which bills passed one 
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or both houses of congress. Twenty-five emergency management bills passed one or both 
houses of the 109th Congress (see Table 7). While the smaller sample of data is not as 
useful, it does help us confirm the previous result.  
Table 7.   Number and percentage of referrals of emergency management passed 
bills and resolutions by committee, 109th Congress 
House Committee Bills Referred Percent 
Transportation and Infrastructure 9 26.5% 
Homeland Security 5 14.7% 
Judiciary 4 11.8% 
Science, Space, and Technology 4 11.8% 
Energy and Commerce 3 8.8% 
Financial Services 2 5.9% 
Ways and Means 2 5.9% 
Appropriations 2 5.9% 
Oversight and Government Reform 1 2.9% 
Education and the Workforce 1 2.9% 
Intelligence (Permanent) 1 2.9% 
Budget  0.0% 
Natural Resources  0.0% 
Agriculture  0.0% 
Armed Services  0.0% 
Foreign Affairs  0.0% 
Small Business  0.0% 
Rules  0.0% 
House Administration  0.0% 
Total House 34 100.0% 
Senate Committee Bills Referred Percent 
Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs 
8 53.3% 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 2 13.3% 
Appropriations 2 13.3% 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1 6.7% 
Judiciary 1 6.7% 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 1 6.7% 
Environment and Public Works  0.0% 
Energy and Natural Resources  0.0% 
Finance  0.0% 
Foreign Relations  0.0% 
Total Senate 15 100.0% 
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In the House, Transportation and Infrastructure and Homeland Security are still 
the top two committees receiving referred bills, and the Energy and Commerce and 
Financial Services slip down a bit compared to bills introduced. In the Senate, the top 
three are in the same order, except the Senate passed both bills that were introduced and 
referred to the Appropriations Committee, so it moves up the list considerably. Using 
only passed bills provides a much narrower view of jurisdiction, but it confirms that there 
is no major impact on the previous results from legislative noise.  
This case study of the oversight of Hurricane Katrina demonstrates the 
complexity of homeland security, which is intensified by a lack of consensus of what 
homeland security is. In reviewing this case nearly 10 years later, it becomes clear just 
how much consensus has been built for response and recovery from natural disasters to 
be part of homeland security alongside counterterrorism. This may be in part due to better 
results from federal emergency managers that show DHS is willing to give just as much 
priority to both missions. In late 2005, it was far from clear that FEMA would remain a 
part of DHS, and the concept of homeland security may have reverted to a predominantly 
counterterrorism and border security mission in the minds of policy makers.  
Even with a consensus that emergency management is a key part of homeland 
security, there are many functions of DHS which are not. Flood insurance and housing 
were highlighted in this case study. When one inquires why a non-homeland security 
committee has a DHS witness present for a hearing or has had a bill referred to it, there 
seem to be two common reasons. First, that homeland security oversight was left in the 
jurisdiction of another committee in the sausage-making process of writing congressional 
rules; or two, those committees are exercising oversight over a loosely associated or non-
homeland security function of DHS. The agency interaction method, particularly when 
the interactions are not analyzed individually or are not given weight for how often they 
occurred, tends to overlook the fact that DHS has non-homeland security functions. This 
understanding that functions can be combined together in the executive branch for 
efficiency (FEMA derives ancillary benefits in its response mission from the flood plain 
maps that inform the Flood Insurance Program), but that oversight of those functions may 
be combined in different ways, also for efficiency, is lacking in the literature. 
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These two case studies also showed the value in exploring bill referrals further. 
One of the weaknesses of the agency interaction method, when using only hearings, is the 
small sample size. The second case study looked at 46 hearings versus 264 emergency 
management bills and resolutions in the 109th Congress. The next chapter includes a 
larger examination of bill referrals as well as an examination of agency interactions, 
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V. QUANTITATIVE DATA 
The case studies in the preceding chapter showed that there are two methods of 
measurement that lend themselves to quantitative analysis. The third, explicit jurisdiction, 
is much more opaque and while it does provide valuable insight in smaller cases, it  
would be difficult to analyze quantitatively. In the previous chapter, the U.S. Fire 
Administration case study showed that bill referrals are at times murky, and at other 
times, useful for analysis. The Hurricane Katrina case study showed that in the aggregate, 
bill referrals could provide additional insight into trends. In this chapter, the first section 
will look at trends in legislation related to homeland security and, specifically, the 
Department of Homeland Security in relation to general trends for all bills. It will identify 
a previously undocumented barrier to passage for homeland security legislation.  
The second section of this chapter will take a new approach to quantitatively 
analyzing agency interaction data. Agency interaction is by far the most common method 
used in quantitative analysis in the literature and the case studies identified significant 
limitations to how it has been used in the past. 151  However, to counteract those 
limitations, the second section of this chapter will analyze a much larger sample of 
agency interaction data than previous efforts by utilizing briefing data that accounts for 
nearly 90 percent of all documented agency interactions with Congress. Additionally, that 
data has been converted into relational tables that remove some of the limitations of using 
aggregate agency interaction data. The result is a new visualization of homeland security 
oversight that starkly contrasts with previous images. 
A. THE IMPACT OF MULTIPLE REFERRALS ON HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
The most salient complaint about the current state of oversight of homeland 
security has been the difficulty in passing necessary legislation—of particular note a 
                                                 
151 Furthermore, in most cases that analysis has not been particularly deep or rigorous even with the 
limitations of the method. The most notable exceptions are recent releases from the DHS Office of 
Legislative Affairs that show the magnitude of agency interactions and Balunis and Hemphill’s use of the 
Herfindahl index to shows relative fragmentation of oversight of several cabinet agencies. 
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reauthorization of DHS. It can be argued that the burden of responding to oversight can 
be absorbed by a large bureaucracy and the executive branch can provide its own 
leadership on policy, but the homeland security enterprise needs changes in statute from 
time to time to face evolving threats and circumstances. Congressional researchers Roger 
Davidson, Walter Oleszek, and Thomas Kephart noted complaints from members of 
Congress that a new development would “promote jurisdictional rivalry; produce 
duplication in hearings, meetings and reports; encourage delays in the legislative process; 
and give new weapons to groups determined to delay, modify, or kill legislation.”152 The 
new development they were writing about in 1988 was the 1975 change in House rules to 
allow bills to be referred to more than one committee. Some of these complaints were 
supported by facts—particularly that multiply-referred bills have less success in gaining 
passage than ones referred to a single committee. That some of the same complaints 
about oversight of homeland security mirror complaints about multiple referrals 
necessitates a review of how multiple referrals operate and how legislation has a greater 
chance of success with multiple referral rules in place. 
The referral of bills is solely within the discretion of the speaker of the House and 
presiding officer of the Senate, but it is generally delegated to the House and Senate 
parliamentarians. Absent outside factors, such as agreement between chairmen, referral 
decisions are made based on the rules of each chamber and precedent. Prior to 1975 in 
the House and 1946 in the Senate, bills introduced in that chamber or transmitted from 
the other chamber after passage would only be referred to one committee based on the 
preponderance of the subject matter. With the availability of rules that allow for bills to 
be referred to multiple committees, bills can be referred to as many committees as 
necessary if there are competing claims on jurisdiction or if there are topics covered in 
the same bill that would have been referred to multiple committees had they been 
addressed in separate bills. Bills can be referred jointly, sequentially, or split. Jointly 
referred bills are sent to each committee at the same time for each committee to amend 
and report out; all committees must take action for the bill to move forward. Bills that are 
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referred sequentially go to one committee for action first, and after that committee takes 
action, they are then referred in a predetermined sequence to the other committees for 
their subsequent action. Generally, under sequential referral, each committee has a set 
amount of time to accomplish its work or it loses the opportunity to take committee 
action. Split referrals, allowed in the House but not the Senate, refer specific titles or 
sections to two or more committees but are rarely used because not all bills easily divide 
into chapters.153  
Davisdson, Oleszek, and Kephart studied the impacts of multiple referral rules in 
1988. They found that bills introduced and “sent to a single committee had nearly twice 
the chance of being passed as a measure sent to two or more committees.”154 Their 
research identified the ratio of multiply-referred measures that are referred to two (80.5 
percent), three (14 percent), and four or more (5.5 percent) committees in the 99th 
Congress. Using that ratio, counting bills referred to more than four committees as only 
four committees, and applying it to information from Congress.gov it can be extrapolated 
that during the 94th–99th congresses, that 11.1 percent of bills introduced in the House 
were referred to more than one committee, and yet only 7.2 percent of those bills passed 
the House. The difference in the expected outcomes of multiply-referred bills is 3.9 
percentage points; this figure can be considered the barrier to passage of multiple 
referral.155 The exception to the multiple referral barrier to passage are sequentially 
referred bills, of which there are relatively few. In the 99th Congress:  
                                                 
153 Ibid., 6. 
154 Ibid., 23. They included all measures referred to a committee, which includes resolutions, which 
are largely ceremonial and which only ~3.5 percent were referred to more than one committee in the 113th 
Congress. 
155 Data on Congress.gov is not aggregated in a way to show how many bills have multiple referrals. It 
does show the number of bills and the number of referrals by committee. For example, if there are 10 bills 
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least five of the bills were referred to exactly one committee and the other five could have been referred to 
two committees each or an additional four bills were also referred to one committee each, and the tenth bill 
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more than one committee. Solution reviewed by Joel Barnes, PhD, Mathematics, University of 
Washington, 2014.  
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[a]ll but two of the 58 measures referred sequentially to two or more 
committees were in fact reported by the relevant committees. Six out of 
every ten of these measures were ultimately passed on the House floor. 
Time limits for sequential referrals often have the effect of expediting the 
legislative process.156 
The barrier to passage of multiple referral is stronger in the 113th Congress than in 
the 1980s. Using the same ratio of the number of committees involved in multiple 
referrals (80.5%/14%/5.5%) that Davidson, Oleszek and Kephart identified, 32.9 percent 
of bills were referred to more than one committee in the House in the 113th Congress. 
However, only 23.8 percent of bills that passed the House were referred to more than one 
committee; a barrier to passage of 9.1 percentage points. Both the prevalence of multiple 
referrals and the barrier to passage have increased nearly threefold. 
Compared to all bills introduced in the House in the 113th Congress, homeland 
security related bills that are multiply-referred have an even stronger barrier to passage. 
Bills in the emergency management policy area had a 13.7 point barrier to passage from 
multiple referrals. Furthermore, 72.9 percent of the 282 bills with the organization subject 
Department of Homeland Security were referred to multiple committees in the 113th 
Congress; only 33.1 percent passed the House, resulting in a 39.8 point barrier to passage 
from multiple referrals.157 However, there is something skewing this data. Davidson, 
Oleszek, and Kephart poignantly note that “Members introduce measures for various 
reasons; inaction may be the preferred outcome.”158 Of late, there has been a fraught 
conversation over immigration reform. In the 113th Congress, the Senate passed a 
bipartisan, comprehensive, immigration reform bill. The House did not take up the Senate 
passed measure, but instead it introduced 139 bills in the immigration legislative policy 
                                                 
156 Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart, “One Bill, Many Committees,” 24. 
157 The Library of Congress describes the different types of subject tags in its databases: “The policy 
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consistently used for all bills and resolutions introduced since 2009 (111th Congress).” Congress.gov 
Glossary, s.v., “legislative subject term.”  
158 Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart, “One Bill, Many Committees,” 17. 
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area; only four passed the House. Furthermore, 61 ones of those measures were also 
tagged with the organization subject name “Department of Homeland Security,” of which 
30 were referred to more than one committee and only one (a singly-referred measure) 
passed the house. Controlling for this by removing immigration policy area bills, the 
barrier to passage of multiply-referred bills drops from 39.8 points to 27.8 points. This is 
still three times the barrier to passage of all House bills in the 113th Congress.  
This is a demonstrable impact on homeland security legislation; while other 
studies have raised anecdotal cases, the legislative data proves that homeland security 
bills fare worse than the average bill. The 113th Congress narrowly avoided the title of 
“least productive” Congress in terms of substantive matters passed into law but only 
because the 112th was slightly less productive.159 Changing the way multiple referrals 
work in certain ways would lower the barrier to passage for all bills, and it could have a 
disparately positive impact on the chances of passage for homeland security related bills. 
B. A NEW APPROACH TO VISUALIZING HOMELAND SECURITY 
OVERSIGHT 
Agency interaction is a very important method of measurement for research. 
Either a meeting occurred or it did not. As the case studies in the previous chapter 
showed, analysis of agency interactions does contribute to the overall picture of 
jurisdiction, especially when examining the hearing records for the title or the transcript 
to know what the DHS officials were discussing with Congress. Agency interaction 
analysis loses much of this benefit when aggregated and used as a binary measure of 
jurisdiction—that is counting a committee with one hearing or briefing the same as one 
with 600 briefings and hearings. Additionally, it is misleading to suggest a committee or 
any of its subcommittees has jurisdiction over the entirety DHS when it only has 
jurisdiction over a small part. These downsides can be mitigated to some degree by 
increasing the sample size and paying attention to magnitude. There have been several 
                                                 
159 Drew DeSilver, “In Late Spurt of Activity, Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title,” Pew 
Research Center FactTank, December 29, 2014, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-
spurt-of-activity-congress-avoids-least-productive-title/.  
66 
efforts to visually demonstrate homeland security oversight; however, they generally fail 
to create a nuanced view (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2.  Congressional oversight of DHS160  
                                                 
160 Laskow, “Is Congress Failing on Homeland Security Oversight?”  
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Figure 3.  DHS wire diagram161  
Both Figure 2 and Figure 3 are certainly designed to convince the observer that 
homeland security oversight is complex and fractured; however, they fail to show the 
magnitude of the committees’ interactions and thus do not show the true complexity of 
the issue. The CSIS/BENS research (see Figure 4) attempted to show the nuance of 
oversight with its spider web chart. In part, it overcomes two of three major challenges. It 
has increased the sample size by including non-hearing engagements (although this may 
have been done simply to artificially increase the number of entities on the chart), and it 
also shows the links between the individual committees and components of DHS. It is 
lacking any display of magnitude and as such makes all committees seem of equal 
importance. This chart could be greatly improved by showing some degree of magnitude. 
Also the use of subcommittees makes this chart needlessly confusing. As has been 
previously discussed, subcommittees do delegated work from the full committee and in 
the House they even share staff. When using briefings and other non-hearing 
engagements, even in the Senate, it is generally not possible to distinguish between 
subcommittees.  
 
                                                 
161 Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, Ten Years Ago, the 9/11 
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Figure 4.  CSIS/BENS “spider web” chart162 
 
                                                 
162 CSIS/BENS, Untangling the Web, Appendix A.  
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In recent years, the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs has produced some charts 
that start to show the magnitude of congressional interactions, such as the one in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  DHS congressional engagement 112th Congress163 
The most accurate visualization would be a hybrid of the CSIS/BENS method that 
maps the connections between committees and components, and also captures magnitude 
based on the number of committee interactions. This research used tools from the field of 
social network analysis that are designed to analyze interactions and attributes of the  
 
 
                                                 
163 Office of Legislative Affairs, “DHS Congressional Engagement, 112th Congress,” published in 
Task Force, Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight. 
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actors. Ucinet164 and Net Draw165 are software applications that are capable of ingesting 
large amounts of data and applying complex measures of centrality and other analytical 
measures to networks. In most studies, the more complete the network data the better the 
results will be.  
This research analyzed non-hearing congressional data, mostly comprised of 
briefings between DHS officials and committee staff. In addition to being a larger sample, 
using briefing data may be a better measure of oversight. In 2010, DHS officials testified 
191 times (138 hearings, some with multiple DHS witnesses).166 While hearings are an 
important tool in oversight (they are certainly the most visible), they do not necessarily 
constitute the main avenue of oversight. Furthermore, it could be argued they do not 
produce the most effective oversight, as they largely consist of prepared statements, 
overly political sentiments from members of Congress, and overly cautious answers from 
agency witnesses. Congressional briefings are the day-to-day work of oversight that 
inform Congress of agency operations and inform agencies of the views of Congress.  
Routine briefings are largely what define the “police patrol” method of oversight. 
In 2010, DHS participated in over 2,000 briefings. 167  Hearings are a big logistical 
challenge both for the committees and the agency witnesses. As such, committees have a 
limited number of hearings per year, but they have a lot more flexibility for staff briefings. 
For example, the House Committee on Homeland Security held 43 hearings in 2010 (32 
with DHS witnesses) but DHS officials met with CHS staff 611 times in 2010.168 Those 
numbers are roughly proportional in the total number of hearings and briefings (23 
                                                 
164 Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and Jeffrey C. Freeman, Ucinet for Windows: Software for 
Social Network Analysis (Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies, 2002).  
165 Stephen P. Borgatti, Net Draw Software for Network Visualization (Lexington, KY: Analytic 
Technologies, 2002).  
166 Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hearing and Briefing 
Metrics 111th Congress 2nd Session” (unpublished document, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
167 Ibid.  
168 There are 611 entries in the briefing matrix created during this research, some of these will be 
duplicated records. For example, a Meeting with the House Committee on Homeland Security attended by 
CBP, ICE, and the Privacy Office would be counted three times in order to capture the tie between each of 
the DHS components and CHS. U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security Democrats, “Hearings and 
Markups,” 2010, http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/Hearings/index.asp. 
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percent of the all hearings, and 27 percent of all briefings), but the sheer number of 
interactions likely has an important impact on DHS. There are also important outliers to 
consider. The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure held 8.7 percent of 
the hearings in 2010 but only 41 or 1.8 percent of the briefings total.169 Conversely, the 
Senate Appropriations Committee held two hearings in 2010 or 1.4 percent of the total, 
but accounted for 15.6 percent of the briefings.170 The larger sample size of briefings 
may make up for any of the shortcomings of striping the data from its context that is 
necessary when analyzing bulk data using the agency interaction method of measuring 
oversight. 
For this research, those approximately 2,000 briefings were turned into a matrix 
or relational table that shows how many briefings each DHS component or office 
participated in with each committee.171 The sociogram that is derived from that table in 
Figure 6 shows the network of agency interactions where each DHS component or office 
(red circles) and each committee (blue squares) is a node in the network and the links 
between them represent a connection based on each being involved in a non-hearing 
engagement(s) with the other. Net Draw pulls data entered into Ucinet and plots the 
information in a network based on several measures of centrality.172 The nodes shown 
closest to the center are generally the most central to the network based both upon the 
number of total meetings and the number of nodes they have interactions with.  
                                                 
169 Office of Legislative Affairs, “Hearing and Briefing Metrics 111th Congress.” 
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Figure 6.  DHS 2010 relational briefing data displayed by Net Draw 
At first glance, the map of committee interactions with DHS components in 
Figure 6 appears as complicated as the visualizations from previous research. Looking 
closer, one can see that some nodes are significantly larger than others (they are based on 
the number of interactions) and that some committees are on the far outskirts of the map. 
Furthermore, the software tools allow for a significant amount of additional manipulation. 
Since none of the committees are directly tied to each other, removing the DHS elements 
from the sociogram (though not the calculations) also removes all the ties. The result in 
Figure 7 provides an interesting clustering. Since the distance from the center is related to 
the centrality of the committees, drawing concentric rings reveals a tiered oversight 
regime. The resulting visualization shows the four homeland security committees as the 
most central to the network; the only close challenger for centrality is the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 
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Figure 7.  DHS briefing data, with notional tiers of jurisdiction 
In Figure 7, tier 1 might be considered to have complete oversight into every 
aspect of DHS operations. The further out the committee is in the tiers, the less 
comprehensive their oversight of DHS, despite their explicit jurisdiction in the rules. This 
provides a much different view than the other charts that have been produced by others. 
Those charts see oversight jurisdiction as a binary function, either the committee or 
subcommittee has oversight of DHS or it does not. This chart makes it clear that the 
homeland security committees are more central and important than the others when 
looking at the department overall.  
Because it is clear from the congressional record that whole elements of DHS 
were purposefully denied from the jurisdiction of the homeland security authorizing 
committees, it may be useful to look at segments of DHS individually to get a better 
sense of how those portions of DHS look. Isolating different elements of DHS shows that 
the homeland security committees have more or less clear jurisdiction despite the role of 
certain committees in certain segments of the DHS mission space. For the major 
components of DHS that deal with immigration and border security, a slightly different 
picture emerges in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.  Oversight of immigration and border security 
In Figure 8, centrality is less important than in Figure 7 (although the four 
homeland committees are still central) as a committee with briefings from all three DHS 
components would be considered very central. Instead, the strength of the ties will be 
more useful for analysis. The thickness of the lines in Figure 8 is directly related to the 
number of interactions each node shared with nodes linked to it. The four homeland 
committees still loom largest. House and Senate Judiciary Committees also have strong 
ties, as is expected given their jurisdiction over immigration. Senate Finance, the 
committee that conducts the confirmation process for the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) commissioner, and the House Ways and Means Committee also have 
ties to CBP, but they are not particularly strong compared to the homeland security 
committees.  
One of the concerns of the 9/11 Commission was that when it came to homeland 
security, DHS leaders would not know from where to take their direction. It is absolutely 
possible to make that case when the homeland security committees are removed from the 
mix. In Figure 9, without the ties to the homeland security committees, the immigration 
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and border security elements of DHS would be guided only by weak, relatively 
equivalent committees, but this is not the case in the original image with all committees 
visible. 
 
Figure 9.  Oversight of immigration and border security without homeland 
security committees 
This finding regarding direction from the homeland security committees is fairly 
similar on the side of homeland security that relates to intelligence, preparedness, 
emergency management, and response. Using the same 2010 briefing data, Figure 10 
provides a potentially very confusing picture without the homeland security committees, 
but when the homeland security committees are added back in, it provides the potential 
for much clearer policy direction (Figure 11). 
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Figure 10.  Preparedness and response without the homeland security committees 
 
Figure 11.  Preparedness and response with guidance from the homeland security 
committees 
In Figures 10 and 11, the intelligence committees are somewhat prominent with 
strong ties to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A). This makes sense given that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is 
the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer and represents the Department in the Intelligence 
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Community and that the USCG is also a member of the Intelligence Community. 
Commerce Science and Transportation (CS&T), and Transportation and Infrastructure 
(T&I) have the next strongest ties outside of the homeland security committees; however, 
USCG and FEMA have just as strong, if not stronger, ties to the homeland security 
committees than they do to CS&T or T&I. 
Visual representations of jurisdiction have been a powerful tool in the discussion 
of oversight of DHS. If the charts developed by this research replace those that have 
come before, then there will be a much better understanding of how DHS is overseen by 
Congress. The goal should never be to remove all but the homeland security committees 
from the map because those committees have responsibility for government wide issues 
that are a part of DHS and their members and staff often bring important expertise. It 
could become a goal to move most committees to the outer tiers.  
There are only a handful of relevant decision makers when it comes to 
congressional jurisdiction, and so far they have been reluctant to act. In any case, even if 
the staunchest advocates for reform were to become part of the House and Senate 
leadership, it would never be possible to remove all of these committees from the map. 
With the exception of legislation, those decision makers likely know that things are not as 
dire as the 9/11 commissioners continue to claim. However, with a more nuanced view of 
homeland security and congressional oversight, minor reform may become possible.  
Previous efforts to show oversight of homeland security visually have been 
disingenuous, or based on limited data. In the 112th Congress, the number of committees, 
subcommittees, caucuses, and other groups that DHS had interactions with was reported 
to be 119.173 Of those, only 92 were committees or subcommittees, and of those, 27 did 
not hold a hearing in the 112th Congress. An additional 23 only held one hearing and five 
or fewer briefings.174 As has been shown throughout this thesis, it is possible to have an 
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interaction with DHS officials over non-homeland security topics and without duplicating 
efforts of other committees or providing conflicting policy direction. It would be difficult 
to argue that one hearing or a handful of briefings adds to the burden of oversight 
tremendously. In addition, 42 committees and subcommittees is much closer to the 36 
committees and subcommittees that the Department of Defense reportedly answered to 
back in 2004.175 Homeland security is a large, complex field, and DHS is a large agency 
with many disparate missions; it is not necessary to ignore the committees with limited 
interactions, as long as they are put in the proper context (i.e., tiers 2–5 of the homeland 
security oversight map, shown in Figure 7). 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION  
This research shows that there are fundamental aspects of homeland security and 
congressional organization that would make completely consolidating oversight 
ineffective or inefficient. Nevertheless, the research also shows that there are clear places 
where the homeland security committees need more authority. This chapter will present 
recommendations that are based on this research to create the optimal oversight of 
homeland security. This research is occasionally at odds with the majority of research and 
opinions on this issue, and at other times agrees with or presents new ideas. Some of the 
recommendations will advocate rule changes similar to what has been advocated 
previously, while recognizing that it has been ten years since Congress last made 
significant changes to its rules for the benefit of homeland security despite powerful 
figures and groups in homeland security advocating for the Congress to continue 
consolidation since then. While rule changes will do the most good for homeland 
security, there are ways to improve homeland security oversight without reforming the 
rules, and this chapter will pragmatically provide both types of recommendations. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CHANGE CONGRESSIONAL RULES 
Changing the rules of the House and Senate will have the most impact on creating 
an optimal oversight structure for homeland security. This research identifies five issues 
and associated recommendations to change the congressional rules.  
1. Issue 1 
While the 9/11 Commission popularized the idea of consolidated oversight of 
homeland security, the Bremmer, Hart-Rudman, and Gilmore commissions all 
recommended some consolidation; however, these recommendations were made before 
the Department of Homeland Security was even an idea. As such, they were likely 
concerned that an issue crossing departments and committees of Congress might not be 
dealt with adequately or would fall through the cracks. They likely envisioned a system 
similar to the intelligence committees, which have oversight of all Intelligence 
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Community members scattered across seven departments and independent agencies. In 
that model, a homeland security committee would have oversight over all aspects of 
homeland security regardless in which agency they fall.  
Even when the 9/11 Commission issued its final report, there was some concern 
that the homeland security committees were going to end up being dissolved and 
oversight divided between the remaining standing committees. The findings presented in 
Chapter V showed that there would be a noticeable problem with policy direction from 
oversight were that to have happened, and perhaps no committee would be thinking 
strategically about homeland security given their hefty responsibilities overseeing other 
aspects of the government. Yet with the current committee structure, the findings in 
Chapter V show that there is clear guidance from the homeland security committees, and 
the case studies show that other oversight is generally not over homeland security issues 
with a few notable exceptions. The House Committee on Homeland Security already has 
jurisdiction of “overall homeland security policy,” and while the senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee is lacking such clear language, it has been 
exercising such oversight.  
a. Recommendation 1 
The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee should be 
given clear overarching jurisdiction over homeland security policy in the rules of the 
Senate to match the oversight jurisdiction of the House Committee on Homeland 
Security.  
2. Issue 2 
This thesis argues that the current thinking on oversight of homeland security 
does not mirror the multidisciplinary nature of homeland security. The Department of 
Homeland Security will never be able to neatly fit within the jurisdiction of one 
committee of each house of Congress. The thinking that it could flies in the face of the 
congressional committee system, in which many committees have jurisdiction over broad 
issues in addition to jurisdiction over particular agencies or parts thereof. In fact, 
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consolidating jurisdiction further than has already been done could harm homeland 
security in certain circumstances. Committees build up expertise in their members and 
their staffs over decades and each committee only has a certain capacity for expertise 
because of their limited budgets. However, there are some core homeland security 
functions that are currently outside the jurisdiction of both homeland security 
committees. Prime examples of this include oversight of and emergency management of 
natural disasters in the House and transportation security in the Senate. CHS and HSGAC 
end up conducting oversight of TSA and FEMA as they consider overall homeland 
security policy and allowing other committees to have explicit jurisdiction over them 
does create duplication. TSA can continue to respond to the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee and the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation on 
activities that impact transportation itself and not just transportation security, just as CBP 
answers to Senate Finance and House Ways and Means on revenue issues. In the case of 
Senate Commerce, this will be significantly less oversight than currently constructed.  
a. Recommendation 2 
Oversight of core homeland security functions should be transferred from outside 
committees to the homeland security committees. Emergency management and 
transportation security are key examples where either the House or Senate has provided 
oversight to the homeland security committee but the other has not. 
3. Issue 3 
Homeland security consists of various preparedness, security, response, and 
resiliency functions across sectors. For example, homeland security includes maritime 
security (coastal and ports); the major element of DHS that conducts maritime security, 
the U.S. Coast Guard, is also responsible for maritime safety and lifesaving services. This 
does not mean that maritime safety is an element of homeland security. As such, it does 
not make sense necessarily to provide jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard, in whole, to 
the Committee on Homeland Security in the House or the Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee in the Senate. In order to provide proper oversight of the 
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Coast Guard, each committee would need significantly more expertise in non-maritime 
security issues regarding the Coast Guard than it has now, which would likely mean less 
oversight of other issues. However, the homeland security committees should be 
conducting oversight into the homeland security aspects of Coast Guards operations in 
order to ensure that it is coordinated with overall homeland security policy.  
a. Recommendation 3 
Major functions of DHS currently outside of the homeland security committees’ 
jurisdiction, which stand apart from other issues such as non-security related immigration 
issues (e.g., country quotas) and Coast Guard functions (e.g., aids to navigation) that 
were transferred to DHS, should be transferred to the homeland security committees but 
only if associated staff and budgets are also transferred.  
4. Issue 4 
The case studies in Chapter IV demonstrated that simply because functions are 
co-located within a department or agency for efficiency does not mean that the most 
effective way for Congress to oversee the government is perfect alignment of committees 
and departments. There is not a Department of Insurance that manages all federal 
government insurance programs, but there is a Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, 
and Investments that oversees all government insurance programs wherever they are best 
aligned in the executive branch. Having HSGAC hire insurance expertise just to oversee 
the flood insurance program is not efficient, and it would not necessarily increase 
homeland security. 
a. Recommendation 4 
Functions of DHS that are not core homeland security functions and are closely 
associated with core oversight responsibilities of non-homeland security committees, 
such as flood insurance, housing, and revenue collection, should remain under the 
jurisdiction of committees with expertise to properly oversee those functions.  
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5. Issue 5 
The research in Chapter V shows a very serious problem for homeland security 
oversight: homeland security legislation faces a higher barrier to passage than average 
legislation. This research identified that emergency management legislation and bills 
related to the Department of Homeland Security have a greater barrier to passage due to 
being referred to multiple committees. While topical oversight of DHS by multiple 
committees may result in minor duplication, even after the previous recommendations, 
legislative jurisdiction will still mean that bills relating to homeland security (and 
certainly bills that relate to the entire DHS) will continue to be referred to multiple 
committees more often than not (it is unclear if the added barrier to passage will remain). 
But without these reforms, the dire situation for homeland security legislation remains 
unchanged. The House and Senate may benefit in general from reforming their rules 
relating to multiple referrals, but if it becomes more regimented, homeland security 
oversight will benefit. Congress is already passing a record low number of laws and 
could in general stand to have rules that reduce procedural hurdles.176 To solve the 
problem of committees sitting on legislation they do not like, but do not intend to perfect 
through amendment, there could be a rule in the House and Senate that if a bill is referred 
(non-sequentially) to multiple committees that each committee has a set number of 
calendar or session days to report out the bill or it will automatically be discharged from 
the committee. This is not entirely without precedent; the speaker has set rules governing 
time limits on sequential referrals previously.177 Mark and Walter Oleszek pictured an 
environment of “creative redundancy”178 and former House Rules Committee Chairman 
envisioned “purposeful redundancy” 179  in Congress’s oversight of DHS. However, 
redundancy relies on the concept the when one system fails, the redundant one backs it 
up, not where the redundant system causes the main system to fail.  
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There is surely a reasonable time, whether 30, 60, or 90 days that is enough time 
for a committee intending to take action on a bill to have an opportunity to do so. As 
Chapter V discussed, if committees do not take action on multiply-referred bills, the 
legislation stalls. In the House, bills are often referred “for a period to be subsequently 
determined by the Speaker.” 180  Unfortunately, time limits are rarely placed on the 
committees. It is possible that the speaker rarely subsequently assigns a deadline because 
doing so would seem punitive or overly favoring one committee over another, and setting 
a timeline would be a negative action, rather than a neutral one. If the rules set the 
deadlines automatically, this would remove one of the barriers. The deadlines could 
always be extended in extenuating circumstances, or if it relates to major or complex 
legislation, but extending would be a positive act except at the end of a Congress when 
asking for extension could be a delaying measure to ensure the bill does not move 
forward when there is otherwise consensus to do so. 
a. Recommendation 5  
Congress should adopt rules that, by default, limit the amount of time committees 
have to act on legislation referred to multiple committees before it is automatically 
reported out of committee.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS WITHOUT RULE CHANGES 
These first five recommendations are significantly different from those being 
advocated by the 9/11 commissioners and their supporters at DHS, on the homeland 
security committees, by the media, and in think tanks. They could be seen as a 
compromise between the status quo and what reformers have sought, and they take into 
account the reasons that non-homeland security committee chairs have had in resisting 
reform without assuming they are selfish or uninterested in protecting the country. The 
above recommendations would improve homeland security policy without detracting 
from other missions of the government. Despite the fact that this research, using a more 
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or less complete view of oversight jurisdiction and homeland security, shows the need for 
these reforms, the history of this problem means that there will likely be no change to the 
House or Senate rules. The window for change is small (just at the beginning of every 
Congress) and there is continued interest by the non-homeland security committees in 
maintaining their traditional jurisdictions. CHS Chairman McCaul submitted a statement 
to the House Rules Committee prior to the start of the 114th Congress, making the case 
that has been made for nearly 10 years.181 However, no changes were made despite this 
request and a bevy of activity in 2014 for the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 
Commission’s final report. There are, however, changes that could be made that do not 
require changes to the House and Senate rules. 
1. Issue 6 
Despite incomplete measurements—which lead them to slightly different 
conclusions—the 9/11 commissioners and those that follow their school of thought are 
right to be concerned that homeland security policy can easily become disjointed if there 
is not a committee in each house focused on it. There has been turnover in the leadership 
of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and it has a 
significant workload in its oversight of government management. However, from their 
press releases and public statements Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Carper 
seem to understand the importance of continuing oversight of homeland security across 
the government. Both HSGAC and CHS have had hearings recently with officials from 
the FBI, the National Counter Terrorism Center, state and local governments, the private 
sector, and others who are part of the homeland security enterprise but not DHS. This 
should continue so that one committee in each house is closely following homeland 
security policy. 
a. Recommendation 6 
                                                 
181 Members’ Day Hearing: Before the House Committee on Rules Subcommittee on Rules and 
Organization of the House, Statement from Congressman Michael T. McCaul, Chairman of the U.S. House 




The homeland security committees should continue to provide broad oversight 
and policy direction to all homeland security functions in the federal government as well 
as in state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and the private sector where 
practicable.  
2. Issue 7 
As the agency chiefly concerned with improving overall homeland security, DHS 
should facilitate the homeland security committees in conducting oversight. While TSA 
and the Coast Guard do not technically need to report to HSGAC on homeland security 
matters, they ensure, and should continue to ensure, the Senate has a body that 
institutionally can consider all matters relating to homeland security. While this may 
create some duplication or overlap, it is in DHS’s best interest to have an ally in Congress 
that spends as much time driving a balance between commerce, transportation, and 
security as DHS, the Coast Guard, and TSA do. It is possible to see how this could be 
important if the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee ever began to 
push for changes at TSA and Coast Guard that would be inadvertently detrimental to 
security because it was overemphasizing benefits to commerce or transportation. 
a. Recommendation 7 
DHS should continue to facilitate oversight by the homeland security committees 
by having all components actively engage with them regardless of whether they have 
jurisdiction in the rules of the House and Senate. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE DUPLICATION 
Recommendations 1–7 will undoubtedly lead to some duplication, although 
briefing the same topic to different committees should not always be considered 
duplication. After all, advocates for consolidation will admit that briefing a topic (e.g., a 
cybersecurity initiative) to appropriators and authorizers is not duplicative, as one is 
looking at issues relating to current or future funding and the other is looking at whether 
there are appropriate authorities and how the activity fits into overall homeland security 
policy. Briefing the same topic to the commerce committees is likewise not duplicative 
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because they are considering how it fits into the overall communications and commerce 
policy. Likewise, the Department of Transportation (DOT) should occasionally brief the 
homeland security committees so they can understand how activities under DOT’s 
purview could impact homeland security policy. For example, there has been a recent 
spate of train derailments and explosions due to single trains transporting hundreds of 
tanker cars of crude oil.182 The Department of Transportation has authority over rail 
transportation of hazardous materials and has recently considered changing regulations to 
improve safety.183 The homeland security committees may want to ensure that security is 
taken into account given the explosive potential of these trains. There may be some 
instances where these recommendations will create actual duplication; this is unfortunate, 
and only changes in the House and Senate rules can alleviate that. However, there are 
some additional strategies that could alleviate the burden duplicate oversight poses to 
DHS. 
The 9/11 Commission was concerned about the burden of oversight on senior 
leaders, and all four secretaries of DHS have echoed the concerns. However, one report 
estimated the cost of oversight at $10 million per year.184 DHS has a roughly $60 billion 
budget, and considering that the DHS Office of the Inspector General’s budget alone is 
about $141 million, an additional $10 million in congressional oversight costs does not 
seem overly high on its face.185 Nevertheless, congressional oversight plays an undue 
role in the minds of senior leaders.  
1. Issue 8 
Critics of the current oversight structure argue that it is overly burdensome while 
at the same time recognizing that strong oversight is beneficial to policy. As such, the 
                                                 
182 Associated Press, “West Virginia Train Derails, Sending Oil Tanker into River,” The New York 
Times, February 17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/02/16/us/ap-us-train-derailment.html.  
183 Timothy Cama, “Oil Train Derails, Explodes in West Virginia,” The Hill, February 17, 2015, 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/232922-oil-train-derails-explodes-in-west-virginia.  
184 Task Force, Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight, 12. 
185 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “FY2016 Budget in Brief,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf.  
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only oversight that should be considered burdensome is that which is duplicative and has 
no added value. The case studies showed that there was at least some added value in 
several instances when non-homeland security committees participated in oversight. The 
argument against duplication runs up against the design of Congress as an oversight 
mechanism. Bicameral, bipartisan, and splitting authorization and appropriations, there is 
a certain amount of duplication built into congressional oversight. It was designed to be a 
fully deliberative process that also protects the rights of each house of Congress and 
provides certain rights to minority members. The necessity of seeking consensus on an 
issue in a bicameral and bipartisan way has led to the development of the term, “four 
corners” to describe the top Democrat and top Republican in the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees. 186  When considering the split of authorization and 
appropriations, one could say it goes from the four corners of a square to the eight 
corners of a cube. This is real duplication over the entirety of homeland security. Chapter 
V showed that the four homeland security committees are most central and dominate 
interactions with DHS and the other committees, and yet an outsized amount of attention 
has been given to the overlap in jurisdiction of other committees. 187  The Gilmore 
Commission flirted with the idea of a Joint House and Senate Homeland Security 
committee, but ultimately it recommended the bicameral and split appropriations/
authorizations structure.  
The 9/11 Commission suggested that the authorizing homeland security 
committees should have non-partisan staffs. This part of the recommendation is probably 
the most overlooked by critics of the oversight structure, perhaps because it has been 
                                                 
186 Zach Carter, “Elizabeth Warren Joins Revolt against Wall Street Deal in Government Shutdown 
Talks,” Huffington Post, December 9, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/09/wall-street-
subsidy-shutdown_n_6292950.html.  
187 There will be some overlap and duplication beyond the eight corners, but this can be moderated 
without stripping jurisdiction. For instance, the House Committee on Homeland Security, in exercising its 
oversight of the implementation of overall homeland security policy of the U.S. Coast Guard, should not 
hold hearings on specific non-security related topics, such as aids to navigation or boating safety. Instead, 
CHS could hold hearings specific to port and maritime security or hold a general security oversight hearing 
that looked at a number of topics, including security vulnerabilities to aids to navigation and how boating 
safety classes for members of the public could be used to foster greater security awareness and reporting. 
Likewise, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee should not hold a hearing focusing solely on 
Coast Guard’s port security mission. 
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within the authority of the homeland security committees to implement, but they have not 
done so. It should be noted that the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee has been particularly bi-partisan. In 2007, then Chairman Joseph Lieberman 
(a long time Democrat who had recently re-elected as an Independent and was caucusing 
with the Democrats) changed the seating arrangement to alternate Democrats and 
Republicans around the dais by seniority, rather than sitting on opposite sides.188 On the 
opposite side of the spectrum, the Senate Judiciary Committee maintains separate staff 
email naming conventions for Democrats and Republicans (i.e., @judiciar-
dem.senate.gov and @judiciary-rep.senate.gov). Both of these examples may be only 
symbolic in nature, but they show there are varying degrees of partisanship in committee 
staffs.  
Instead of ditching political staff altogether, one option could be for each 
committee to maintain a relatively large cadre of non-partisan policy experts shared 
between the majority and minority and maintain only a handful of majority and minority 
staff. Given the volatility of congressional staff employment, many experts are likely 
dissuaded from working for congressional committees, but the existence of non-partisan 
positions may encourage even more well-qualified professionals to seek employment 
with the homeland security committees. 
a. Recommendation 8 
The homeland security committees should examine their staffing structures and 
reconsider the potential benefits of non-partisan staff. Where possible, joint engagements 
between multiple committees, chambers, and parties will reduce the burden on DHS.  
2. Issue 9 
The department’s most senior leaders should not testify in front of the non-
homeland security committees as a matter of course, and when they do, there should be 
an understanding that the scope of the hearing is limited to the issues under that 
                                                 
188 “Lieberman Panel Mixes Democrats and Republicans,” The Washington Post, April 9, 2007, sec. 
Politics, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/08/AR2007040800784.html.  
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committee’s jurisdiction. It has become routine for the DHS secretary to testify annually 
(or more frequently) before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees ostensibly due to 
their wide jurisdiction over immigration matters and law enforcement. Ideally, if the 
judiciary committees maintain jurisdiction over immigration (and of course they would 
maintain jurisdiction over federal law enforcement), they should call the heads of the 
agencies under DHS with immigration and law enforcement responsibilities as witnesses 
instead of the DHS secretary. Practically speaking, this has been difficult for DHS to 
insist on because the current and previous administrations have sought comprehensive 
immigration reform legislation that needed to go through the judiciary committees, which 
has necessitated a cabinet level witness. It might be appropriate for a new secretary to 
testify before the judiciary committees in the first year of his or her tenure or to testify 
before other non-homeland security committees in the course of seeking specific major 
legislation or if a major issue arrive within the explicit jurisdiction of another committee.  
a. Recommendation 9 
The secretary of DHS should not testify before non-homeland security 
committees on a regular basis. 
3. Issue 10 
Where it is not possible or politically expedient to send an assistant secretary level 
witness, any hearings with the DHS secretary by non-homeland security committees 
should be scheduled in a more efficient manner. Cabinet officials prepare for days and 
even weeks in advance of hearings, often holding prep sessions with the heads of 
operational components and other senior policy experts and advisors in order to be able to 
competently answer questions about any part of their department.189 Some may argue 
that well performing officials should be able to answer questions without this preparation. 
Anyone who has testified before even a friendly committee, will tell that a good memory 
and rapid recall will not provide one with the latest status of the major programs in a 
                                                 
189 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Calendars of Secretary Napolitano,” DHS FOIA Reading 
Room,” accessed February 18, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/calendars-senior-officials.  
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department with 230,000 employees and a $60 billion budget. It may be that the 
incumbent secretary at any given time would prefer to have hearings spaced out evenly 
throughout the year, but a best practice that has developed at other agencies (and at times 
has been deployed at DHS) is to have hearings with different committees or chambers of 
Congress on consecutive days.190 This minimizes the amount of preparation time, since 
one series of prep sessions, if the hearings are close enough together, can serve to prepare 
a secretary for all. This will free up time for the secretary and his or her senior leadership 
to focus on their principal missions, while facilitating multiple committees’ need for 
oversight. 
a. Recommendation 10 
Hearings with the DHS secretary should be scheduled in a more efficient and 
accommodating manner. 
4. Issue 11 
The non-homeland security committees may need to adjust their understanding of 
their jurisdictions. Committees that maintain oversight over a particular issue should not 
conduct oversight over the entirety of DHS, a component, or office because they have 
oversight of a function carried out by that part of DHS. For example, the House Ways 
and Means Committee has jurisdiction over “Customs revenue, collection districts, and 
ports of entry and delivery.”191 However, it should not attempt to exercise jurisdiction 
over the entirety of Customs and Border Protection or even the entirety of the Office of 
Field Operations or Office of International Trade, which collect revenue and set trade 
policy respectively. DHS and the committee should come to an understanding of how 
liberally to interpret what constitutes an impact on trade or revenue, but it should only 
conduct oversight over matters pertaining to trade and revenue. DHS needs to tread a fine 
line in deciding what information to provide simply as a courtesy to these non-homeland 
security committees. Not providing enough information that committees may find 
                                                 
190 Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, “Congressional Testimony,” accessed 
February 18, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/ola/congressional-testimony  
191 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rules of the House,” House Rule X, Clause (t), §1. 
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relevant to their work will engender a bad relationship between those committees and 
DHS, making it harder for the two to do business together. While providing too much 
information outside the committee’s jurisdiction may create an entitlement to similar 
information in the future. Furthermore, if there are issues of mutual interest that have a 
nexus to both security and non-security functions there should be an inclination toward 
joint briefings and joint hearings with the homeland security committees and other 
committees.192 
a. Recommendation 11 
DHS should limit its interactions with non-homeland security committees to what 
they are given jurisdiction over in the House and Senate rules. Joint briefings between the 
homeland security committees and others could be useful in minimizing the time and 
resources of oversight of the same topic. 
5. Issue 12 
Given the success rate of sequential referrals, the homeland security committees 
may have more success at passing comprehensive reauthorizations bills if they sought to 
have those bills referred sequentially. Barring that, they could try to avoid multiple 
referrals. However, bills that deal with multiple elements of DHS will automatically be 
referred to more than one committee given the patchwork of jurisdiction. Recently, the 
three former secretaries of DHS sent a letter with recommendations on how to improve 
oversight of homeland security in the rules of the House. The letter listed transfers of 
oversight jurisdiction and indicated where the status quo should remain, and concluded 
with “All other current jurisdictions should end.” 193  Even if the homeland security 
committees were given explicit jurisdiction over all elements of DHS (e.g., TSA, FEMA, 
Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (FLETC)), the House and Senate rules would then need to be further changed to 
explicitly prohibit oversight of DHS from all other committees to avoid multiple 
                                                 
192 DHS records show a number of joint briefings between committees and chambers of Congress. 
This greatly reduces the amount of time and resources necessary to respond to oversight requests. 
193 Members’ Day Hearing, 5.   
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referrals. As an extreme example, if a DHS authorization bill in the House set out to 
establish a goal for small business contracting above the government wide goal, the bill 
could conceivably be referred to the House Committee on Small Business unless the rules 
of the House relevant to the that committee were altered to provide jurisdiction only over, 
“Participation of small-business enterprises in Federal procurement and Government 
contracts, except contracts issued by the Department of Homeland Security,” 
a. Recommendation 12 
The homeland security committees should seek to have their bills referred 
sequentially rather than jointly. 
6. Issue 13 
The homeland security committees could also try to break their bills into titles 
that align with the current rules and negotiate with the parliamentarians and other 
committee chairs to have their bills split referred. The House Committee on Homeland 
Security tried this in the 112th Congress by introducing separate bills based on committee 
jurisdictional lines and then incorporating some of them into a larger bill. Table 8 shows 
these bills and the committees to which they were referred. 
Table 8.   Authorization bills referred to House Committee on Homeland Security 
and one other committee 
Bill 
Number Title Second Committee 
H.R. 
2269 
Fire Grants Reauthorization Act of 
2011 Science, Space, and Technology 
H.R. 
2903 FEMA Reauthorization Act of 2012 Transportation and Infrastructure 
H.R. 901 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 








This strategy almost worked. However, other committees sought a sequential 
referral of the parent bill H.R. 3116 in the last months of the Congress, which likely 
would have killed the bill. The chair of the Committee on Homeland Security was able to 
negotiate sequential referrals with three committees but with a one-day time limit. This 
had the effect of allowing each committee to retain its record of bill referrals for the sake 
of precedent but to allow the bill to move forward without any further committee action 
that would delay or block passage. This occurred in the last week of the 112th Congress 
and the bill was placed on the calendar but never taken up on the floor, perhaps because 
passage in the Senate was not possible.194 Sequential referral works best when there is 
some cooperation between committee chairs or when leadership is willing to step in and 
mediate. Instead of hoping to avoid sequential referral or negotiating after the fact, 
sequential referral, with the timeline and instructions that come with it, could be part of 
the initial strategy. This is easier said than done. The twenty-first century is both blessed 
and cursed by transparency and diversity of thought, which has made coming to 
consensus, compromise, and action more costly in politics. The constraints of sequential 
referral are successful because they force either consensus or conflict, which can then be 
addressed. In addition to sequential referral, joint referral could be improved if each 
committee, whether the primary committee or not, is given a very specific timeframe 
(perhaps granting extension for extraordinary measures). This either could be a 
concession that leadership gives to the homeland security committees (any bills that 
propose to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002) or it could be a change that would 
help improve the efficiency of Congress writ large and bring the barrier of passage of 
multiple referrals back down to pre-twenty-first century levels. Nevertheless, homeland 
security would benefit.  
a. Recommendation 13 
The homeland security committee chairs should seek various creative avenues 
with the speaker of the House, presiding officer of the Senate, and other committee chairs 
                                                 
194 The public record is not clear why. Library of Congress, “Bill Summary and Status: H.R. 3116, 
112th Cong.,” accessed January 18, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3116/. 
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to move bills more efficiently through his or her respective chamber, while recognizing 
that other committees have vested interests in legislation that impact DHS. 
7. Issue 14 
The rules could be amended to provide larger jurisdiction to the homeland 
security committees and take it away from other committees. This has been the goal of 
the 9/11 Commission and its allies for ten years and has not proven successful. There are 
alternatives to changing the written jurisdiction to expand oversight. David King argues 
that committees can become “policy entrepreneurs” and deliberately write bills and make 
agreements with other chairmen to get bills referred to their committees, in this way the 
system of precedent will let them creep into areas over which they do not have explicit 
jurisdiction.195 The House Committee on Homeland Security seems to have begun to do 
this in the area of cybersecurity. In the 113th Congress, it had several pieces of 
cybersecurity legislation referred to the committee. Several of those bills became law, 
and CHS has established a solid bill referral precedent for cybersecurity legislation. At 
the very end of the Congress, a bill passed by the Senate to reform the Federal 
Information Security Management Act, which involved oversight and reporting of 
cybersecurity, privacy, and information technology (IT) management for the entire 
federal government and was associated with CHS by the library of Congress. It may help 
them carve out even more jurisdiction over cybersecurity in future years. It is important 
to keep in mind that the goal of these recommendations is not to make the easiest path to 
passing law while disregarding the expert opinions of staff and members of non-
homeland security committees. Rather, the goal is to force action when there is 
disagreement, so that it can be addressed and improve bills.  
a. Recommendation 14 
The homeland security committees should take any parliamentary actions that will 
help them secure larger jurisdiction over homeland security topics.  
                                                 
195 King, Turf Wars.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, this research has shown that there are only four central homeland 
security committees, and they dominate the policy direction that DHS and the homeland 
security enterprise receives (see Figure 12). There are a few structural challenges that an 
agency as new and ubiquitous as DHS faces in Congress. The broad mission of DHS and 
the all-hazards concept of homeland security mean a presence in every major sector of 
American life. Because of this, many committees participate actively in oversight of DHS 
activities. There are some areas of duplication, which should be eliminated or minimized, 
but they are not as great as has previously been argued in other research and advocacy.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Tiers of oversight 
Passing legislation is a significant structural challenge. This research identified 
that legislation referred to more than one committee disproportionately impacts homeland 
security. Given how interconnected homeland security is to the jurisdiction of other 
committees, it is not practical, nor is it politically feasible to strip legislative jurisdiction 
from other committees. Instead, Congress should focus on procedural changes that could 
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improve the legislative process in general and would improve the chances of passage of 
homeland security legislation.  
Homeland security has a large role in Americans’ lives. DHS is by far the federal 
department that Americans interact with the most. Its mission largely revolves around 
protecting human life, and it is an area that if abused could infringe on Americans’ rights. 
As such, it relies on active engagement and oversight by Congress—whom the people 
elected—to ensure the efficient conduct of its mission and for the vital resources and 
authorities to accomplish that mission. While it is important for Congress to have a 
dedicated committee in each house focused on overall homeland security policy, it is just 
as important for homeland security to be considered in an integrated way with all other 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations to change congressional rules: 
1. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
should be given clear overarching jurisdiction over homeland security 
policy in the rules of the Senate to match the oversight jurisdiction of the 
House Committee on Homeland Security.  
2. Oversight of core homeland security functions should be transferred from 
outside committees to the homeland security committees. Emergency 
management and transportation security are key examples where either the 
House or Senate has provided oversight to the homeland security 
committee but the other has not. 
3. Major functions of DHS currently outside of the homeland security 
committees’ jurisdiction, which stand apart from other issues such as non-
security related immigration issues (e.g., country quotas) and Coast Guard 
functions (e.g., aids to navigation) that were transferred to DHS, should be 
transferred to the homeland security committees but only if associated 
staff and budgets are also transferred.  
4. Functions of DHS that are not core homeland security functions and are 
closely associated with core oversight responsibilities of non-homeland 
security committees, such as flood insurance, housing, and revenue 
collection, should remain under the jurisdiction of committees with 
expertise to properly oversee those functions.  
5. Congress should adopt rules that, by default, limit the amount of time 
committees have to act on legislation referred to multiple committees 
before it is automatically reported out of committee.  
Recommendations which do not require rule changes: 
6. The homeland security committees should continue to provide broad 
oversight and policy direction to all homeland security functions in the 
federal government as well as in state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments and the private sector where practicable.  
7. DHS should continue to facilitate oversight by the homeland security 
committees by having all components actively engage with them 
regardless of whether they have jurisdiction in the rules of the House and 
Senate. 
8. The homeland security committees should examine their staffing 
structures and reconsider the potential benefits of non-partisan staff. 
Where possible, joint engagements between multiple committees, 
chambers, and parties will reduce the burden on DHS.  
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9. The secretary of DHS should not testify before non-homeland security 
committees on a regular basis. 
10. Hearings with the DHS secretary should be scheduled in a more efficient 
and accommodating manner. 
11. DHS should limit its interactions with non-homeland security committees 
to what they are given jurisdiction over in the House and Senate rules. 
Joint briefings between the homeland security committees and others 
could be useful in minimizing the time and resources of oversight of the 
same topic. 
12. The homeland security committees should seek to have their bills referred 
sequentially rather than jointly. 
13. The homeland security committee chairs should seek various creative 
avenues with the speaker of the House, presiding officer of the Senate, and 
other committee chairs to move bills more efficiently through his or her 
respective chamber, while recognizing that other committees have vested 
interests in legislation that impact DHS. 
14. The homeland security committees should take any parliamentary actions 





APPENDIX B. HURRICANE KATRINA HEARINGS  
Date Committee Title or Subject of Hearing  DHS Witness 





Guarding Against Waste, Fraud, 
and Abuse in Post-Katrina Relief 








and the Internet 
Public Safety Communications 
from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical 
Public Policy Lessons 
S&T: Dr. David 
Boyd 
9/29/05 House Transportation 
& Infrastructure 
Subcommittee on 





Fisheries & Oceans 
Marine Debris USCG: RADM 
Thomas Gilmour 
9/29/05 Senate Commerce, 
Science & 
Transportation 
Communications In A Disaster S&T: Dr. David 
Boyd 
10/6/05 House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security 







CFO Andy Maner 








Recovering After Katrina: 
Ensuring that FEMA is up to the 
Task 




Date Committee Title or Subject of Hearing  DHS Witness 




FEMA Status Report on Recovery 
Efforts in the Gulf States 
EP&R: David 
Paulison 
10/18/05 Senate Banking, 
Housing & Urban 
Affairs Committee 
National Flood Insurance Program David Maurstad, 
EP&R 
10/19/05 House Select 
Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the 
Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 
Response and Recovery Efforts Secretary Michael 
Chertoff 
10/20/05 House Financial 
Services Committee 
Management and Oversight of the 
National Flood Insurance Program
David Maurstad, 
EP&R 




“Hurricane Katrina in New 















Ensuring Operability During 
Catastrophic Events 
Dr. David Boyd, 
S&T, Dr. Pete 
Fonash, IP 
10/27/05 House Select 
Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the 
Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness 
and Response by the Department 
of Defense, the Coast Guard and 
the National Guard of Louisiana, 
Mississippi and Alabama 
RADM Sirois 
11/2/05 House Select 
Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the 
Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 





Date Committee Title or Subject of Hearing  DHS Witness 
11/8/05 Senate Small Business 
& Entrepreneurship 









and Technology and 






Responding to catastrophic Events: 
The Role of the Military and the 










and Technology and 






Responding to catastrophic Events: 
The Role of the Military and the 






11/9/05 House Select 
Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the 
Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 
Preparedness and Response by the 


















Date Committee Title or Subject of Hearing  DHS Witness 
12/7/05 House Select 
Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the 
Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 
Mississippi Operations William L. 
Carwile, FEMA 
Coordinator 
12/8/05 House Financial 
Services Committee 








Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of 
FEMA’s Operations Professionals 





12/14/05 House Select 
Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the 
Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 
Louisiana Operations Bill Lokey, FCO 
for LA, FEMA, 
Philip Parr, FEMA 
Coordinator 
1/13/06 House Financial 
Services Subcommittee 
on Housing and 
Community 
Opportunity 
Housing needs in the aftermath of 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita and 







1/14/06 House Financial 
Services Subcommittee 
on Housing and 
Community 
Opportunity 
Field hearing entitled “Housing 
Options in the Aftermath of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.” 
Mr. James N. 
(Nick) Russo, 
FCO, FEMA DHS




“Hurricane Katrina: Mississippi’s 
Recovery” 
Donald Powell  




“Preparing for a Catastrophe: The 
Hurricane Pam Exercise.” 
Wayne Fairley, 
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Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search 









Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law 
Enforcement and Communications 
in a Catastrophe 
Michael Vancore-
ICE 
Dr. Peter M. 
Fonash -IP/NCS 




Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of 
DHS and FEMA Leadership 











Hurricane Katrina: Waste, Fraud, 






2/15/06 Senate Banking, 
Housing, & Urban 
Affairs Committee 
Rebuilding Needs in Katrina-
Impacted Areas 









Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland 
Security Department’s Preparation 
and Response 
(DHS Retooling FEMA) 
Secretary 
CHERTOFF  
2/16/06 House Transportation 
and Infrastructure 
Committee 
Disasters and the Department of 
Homeland Security: Where Do We 
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Recommendations for Reform 
DHS-IG Richard 
Skinner 
3/9/06 House Financial 









4/6/06 House Government 
Reform Committee 





Affairs - FEMA 









Management and Oversight of 
Federal Disaster Recovery: Debris 
Removal, Blue Roof Program, & 
Install Case Studies, FIELD 
HEARING Louisiana Supreme 
Court Bldg., 400 Royal Street, 
New Orleans, LA 









“FEMA’s Manufactured Housing 
Program: Haste Makes Waste.” 
David Garratt, 
Director of 
Recovery Efforts - 
FEMA 
5/4/06 House Government 
Reform Committee 
Katrina Contracting Elaine Duke, CPO
Deidre Lee, 
Deputy Director 
for OPS, FEMA 
5/18/06 Senate Special 
Committee on Aging 




5/24/06 House Government 
Reform Committee 
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APPENDIX C. 2010 BRIEFING DATA RELATIONAL TABLE 
  CHS CRS CS&T EPW HAC HAg HASC HE&C HFA HJC HNR HPSCI HSci HSGAC 
CBP 54   5   50   1     1 9 15   36 
CISOMB 1       1         3       1 
CNE 6       1                 1 
CRCL 12                 2       6 
DHS 8             1         3 3 
DNDO 11                       4 8 
FEMA 32   2   16                 11 
FLETC 2       3                 6 
GCR         1                   
I&A 68   2   7   1         30   87 
ICE 87 12 5   36     10 8 37 2 9   49 
IGA 1                         5 
MGMT 31   1   9                 29 
NPPD 56   1   18     2       2 2 41 
OCFO 3                         5 
OCIO                             
110 
  CHS CRS CS&T EPW HAC HAg HASC HE&C HFA HJC HNR HPSCI HSci HSGAC 
OGC 7                 1 2     9 
OHA 29       2                 26 
OIG 1                         1 
OPS 2                         3 
PLCY 18   4   1       2 2 2 2   13 
PRIV 9   1                     5 
S&T 33       4 1   1         3 17 
TSA 105   35   31   1 1   2   4   48 
USCG 19   18 8 13     1   1   3 1 20 
USCIS 9       11       1 11 2 1   3 
USSS 7       2       1 8       3 
Total 611 12 74 8 206 1 3 16 12 68 17 66 13 436 
 
  OGR SAC SAg SASC SBud SENR SFin SFR SIA SJC SSB SSCI Misc T&I W&M Total 
CBP   70   1   3 8 1 1 7   3 23   7 295 
CISOMB   1               2           9 
CNE 1                 1   1       11 
CRCL                               20 
111 
  OGR SAC SAg SASC SBud SENR SFin SFR SIA SJC SSB SSCI Misc T&I W&M Total 
DHS                           1   16 
DNDO   3                           26 
FEMA   29                     7 3   100 
FLETC   1                   8 19     39 
GCR                               1 
I&A   13           2   1   38 21     270 
ICE 1 64       3   3   29     23     378 
IGA                 1         1   8 
MGMT 2 12               12 1 4 1 1   103 
NPPD 2 23   1               1 20     169 
OCFO         1                 1   10 
OCIO                                 
OGC           1       1           21 
OHA   2                           59 
OIG   1                           3 
OPS   1                       1   7 
PLCY 1 1       2   1 1 4   2 1 1   58 
PRIV 1                             16 
112 
  OGR SAC SAg SASC SBud SENR SFin SFR SIA SJC SSB SSCI Misc T&I W&M Total 
S&T   8 1                         68 
TSA 5 75           1   4   2 2 14   330 
USCG 4 36           1       1 14 18   158 
USCIS   3       2   2   6     5     56 
USSS   13               6           40 
Total 17 356 1 2 1 11 8 11 3 73 1 60 136 41 7 
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